IRISH 1798 COLLECTION

Thomas Smith

ON THE

# DEFENCE

OF

# IRELAND:

INCLUDING

# OBSERVATIONS

ON

SOME OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

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*Si Saraceni injuriis fatigati, ab eis (Siculis) cœperint diffidere,* et caſtelli forte maritimæ, vel montanas munitiones occupaverint; ut hinc cum Theutonicis ſumma virtute pugnandum. Illinc Saracenis crebris inſultibus occurrendem, quid putas acturi ſunt inter has depreſſi anguſtias, *et velut inter malleum & incudem conſtituti?*

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This Pamphlet, on the Defence of Ireland, was written by Col. Maurice-St. Leger Keating, who married Lady Martha Brabazon, eldest daughter of Anthony, 8th Earl of Meath.

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TO THE

# READER.

THE Author is ſenſible, that the following ſheets require more correction than it has been in his power to beſtow on them. The obſervations they contain might have been arranged more methodically, and deduced more coherently. Strongly impreſſed with the perilous ſituation of the country, and in the habit of meditating on the train and viciſſitude of human events, he is convinced that there is nothing poſſible, which may not be apprehended. It does not ſeem bad reaſoning, to ſay, that whatever has happened elſewhere, ſimilar cauſes may produce here; and it does not appear bad ſenſe, to reflect ſeriouſly how we would act, were ſuch things to occur here as have happened elſewhere.

In this ſlight ſketch there is, at any rate, no wanderings of imagination, no abſtract theories, no inapplicable ſpeculations, none of thoſe theoretical reveries, ſpecious in the cloſet, but impracticable in the application. There is no opinion

which is not warranted by fact, or by authority; nor any inference which analogy will not juſtify.

Time will ſhew, whether the man who palliates and conceals the imminence of danger, or he who probes the wound, and arouſes to the true ſenſe of it, is the real friend of his country.

# PREFACE.

THE military ſituation of Ireland is little underſtood; yet from local circumſtances, as well as the extraordinary turn human affairs have taken within the laſt ſix years, it is likely to become the ſcene of important tranſactions. Its ſituation between the old and new worlds, its fine harbours, and the number of inhabitants, which the fertility of its ſoil, and its inſular ſituation, enable it to maintain, have cauſed it, notwithſtanding the misfortunes it has laboured under for five centuries paſt, to advance with rapid ſtrides towards its proper ſtation in the ſcale of nations; yet it is little known to its own inhabitants, and too little to its cloſe ally and ſiſter kingdom. It is hoped, that an humble endeavour to make both better acquainted with it, will, if ſucceſsful, be attended with mutual advantages.

Ireland has ſeldom been inſpected by a military eye. Thoſe of its natives who aim at the profeſſion, go where their hopes and ambition have a greater field; and the Britiſh military ſervice is not exactly calculated to encourage application or ſtudy; for we ſee too many inſtances, where

where, after an officer has devoted his life (the beſt part of it) thereto, he finds the utmoſt to which he can extend his hopes, is permiſſion to retire. That it is not in the field or the cloſet, but at the levee, that he ought to have employed his time; and that his application to his ſcience has been thrown away, in acquiring knowledge, of which, when acquired, there is no one capable of judging, and which muſt therefore, in all probability, remain locked up in his breaſt for ever.

The only real military work wrote in the Engliſh language, is by General Lloyd: His two volumes, particularly his ſecond, contain ideas that can never be too much revolved in a military man's mind. In this light they are conſidered by the officers of ſcience on the continent: they prove the extent of his genius. What little more has been written in Engliſh, is merely compilation, ſome of which is ſelected with tolerable judgment, from the only good ſchool, the Pruſſian; the reſt conſiſts of puerilities, which nothing but the groſs ignorance of the nation, in every thing that regards that profeſſion, could have enabled to pay for paper and printing.

However, ſuch as they are, by dint of great names, lofty deductions, and long liſts of ſubſcribers, they contrive to hold their ſtation upon the ſhelves of every man, who wiſhes to hold himſelf forth in the light of a martinet.

The

The yagers, or gamekeepers of the Auſtrian gentry, are in time of war formed into corps, receiving double pay. Each corps, in the ſeven years war, conſiſted of about two hundred. The utility of them muſt be obvious. They were all men of approved fidelity, and excellent markſmen; but the principal advantage derived from them was, that they could not be placed in a ſpot of the German empire, with which at leaſt ſome of them were not intimately acquainted. Every mountain, defile, river and paſs, they had a thorough knowledge of, and therefore could approach nearer the enemy, and watch his motions more cloſely and more ſafely, than any other corps of light troops whatſoever.

Of theſe corps, during the ſeven years war, one was commanded by Lloyd, the other by a moſt able officer, Edward Count Dalton, who ſerved, as did ſeveral more of his family, the Houſe of Auſtria for many years, with equal advantage to it, and credit to themſelves. He finiſhed his honourable career by a cannon ſhot at Dunkirk.

So much has been ſaid of General Lloyd, prefatory to the introduction of certain obſervations quoted from his writings, part of which, the event has proved prophetical; what has not yet been proved ſo, it is to be hoped, wiſe meaſures and foreſight will furniſh the means of contradicting.

After

After deſcribing the general ſtrength of the French frontier, ſpeaking of that part from Sedan to Dunkirk, he ſays: It has been the ſcene of ſucceſſive wars for near two centuries; the moſt expenſive, bloody and durable, of any recorded in the annals of mankind.

This line is ſtronger by art than by nature, having a prodigious number of ſtrong fortreſſes and poſts on it; moreover, it projects in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter it nowhere, without having ſome of them in front and on his flanks. His depots muſt be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thouſand men, and another of equal force about Condè, will ſo bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep without imminent danger; for that which we ſuppoſe on the Sambre, by maſking Namur, penetrates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the preſent ſtate of Auſtrian Flanders, (1780), and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from overrunning the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

Vol. II. page 181, Lloyd ſays: When the combined fleet appeared on our coaſt, the nation, unaccuſtomed to ſee an enemy ſo near, ſeemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the poſſible reſults of an invaſion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, (which he indeed

indeed effectually did); determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast.

Vol. II. page 118, speaking of Rome, he says: *After the expulsion of their kings, it became a democracy, and every citizen was bred and trained a soldier*; it was the only trade; the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief occupation was war. *Necessity first made that republic purely military.* The right was in the people, but the power really in the senate. The senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people, became daily more wanton in their oppressions. To secure their usurpations, the most proper method was to engage the people in continual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance. The virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the citizen; no human reward was refused to great military merit. With that knowledge, the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can excite a man to the vigorous exertion of his forces, such a people *must necessarily become finally superior to every other people, placed in different circumstances.*

This

This difference alone rendered Rome, a military republic, ſuperior to Carthage, a commercial one. The firſt ſpecies of republics muſt probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the laſt by thoſe of a foreigner.

P. 115, he ſays: Carthage was often involved in wars, on account of its diſtant ſettlements. Their armies were ſufficient againſt the people they contended with, when their operations were confined to their iſlands, and the coaſt, becauſe their fleets could co-operate with ſucceſs; and had they carried their views no farther, they might probably have exiſted many ages longer. But long and diſtant wars, ſupported only by money and mercenaries, brought on neceſſarily their diſtreſs and final deſtruction.

P. 117, ſpeaking of a confederate army, he ſays: The views of the different parties ſeldom coincide in the various points, which occur in a long and extenſive war: When oppoſed to ſuch an army, temporize, uſe inſinuations and ſeductions; ſome one or other of the parties will grow tired, and fall under the temptation; or attack vigorouſly the dominions of one of the members; this will create a powerful diverſion, and his defection will probably break the confederacy.

If any thing in the following pages, can tend to convince the people of theſe countries, of

their

their alarming ſituation, of the danger of the enemy they are now at war with, and of the neceſſity of a general exertion of the whole people, and that they can place no reliance on foreign ſuccour, the view with which they are written will be fulfilled.

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2. A Map of Turenne's and Montecuculi's Operations on the Rhine.
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5. Of William's Campaigns.
6. Of the Poſitions laid down by the King of Pruſſia.

And other Plans, illuſtrative of the Military Operations quoted in this Work.

ON THE

# DEFENCE

OF

# *IRELAND.*

## CHAP. I.

### OF ITS IMPORTANCE, &c.

*Of the Face of the Country—Coaſts—Harbours—Landing Places—Inhabitants—Towns—Natural and Artificial Strength.*

IRELAND, ſituated at the extremity of the old world, has for ſome centuries back, been hardly known to it, farther than appearing an unimportant ſpot in the map of Europe. Yet this ſmall ſpot is probably more eſſential, not merely to the conſequence, but to the very exiſtence of England, than all thoſe exterior poſſeſſions, to retain or acquire which, ſhe has been laviſhing her blood and treaſure, and accumulating debt upon her landed property for this century paſt. Extraordinary as it may appear, with all the advantages the iſland in queſtion poſſeſſes, the benefits which England appears to have endeavoured to derive from her, have been merely negative. It ſeems as if the object of the ſiſter kingdom had been not to derive good, but

to prevent the poſſibility of rivalſhip;—witneſs the reſtrictions on her trade, taken off a few years ago *.

But if England thinks it neceſſary for her, as ſhe ever muſt, to maintain a navy for the defence, not only of her exterior poſſeſſions, but alſo of her own coaſt, the ſituation of Ireland points it out for the place of arms.

The weſterly and ſouth weſterly winds which prevail in theſe latitudes for nine months in the year, are an inſuperable diſadvantage to England as a naval power; and from the port of Breſt, by its ſituation on the Atlantic, a blow can be given to England before her fleet could get out of the Channel. But Cork poſſeſſes the ſame advantages over Breſt, which Breſt does over Plymouth, not to mention the many other fine harbours on our coaſt, whoſe names are hardly known out of Ireland.

Perhaps the importance of Ireland to the ſiſter kingdom will never be felt, unleſs it falls into the hands of an enemy. Should that ever be the caſe, the poſſeſſion of it would empower that enemy, from its ſouth weſtern and northern points, effectually to cripple the naval and commercial exertions of England, and in conſequence, reduce her to as inſignificant a ſtate, as the iſland of Sardinia, in the ſcale of European powers. In fact, if a great naval power ever cultivates the advantages of Ireland to the utmoſt, that will alone inſure her dictating to all the reſt of Europe on the ocean.

* Thoſe reſtrictions were of no benefit to England, tho' ruinous to Ireland. One or two trading towns, indeed, derived ſome trifling advantage, but by no means ſuch as to make it a national concern.

But

But we muſt likewiſe throw into the ſcale, the great ſupplies which this country affords to a naval power. Except the article of timber, ſhe has, or may have, every other. In the article of proviſions, the fertility of her ſoil and mildneſs of her climate, give her a decided advantage over any other country in the univerſe. Her ports are never frozen up, as is the caſe in the north of Europe and America; and ſhe has none of thoſe tedious and dangerous channel navigations, which all the other nations of Europe, France and Spain only excepted, are obliged to undergo.

Should Ireland by the misfortune of war fall into the power of any foreign country, the ſeparation from England would be felt and deplored; their ſituations and mutual wants are ſuch as no ſubſtitute could be found for. The linen trade which conſtitutes the wealth of half the kingdom, and coals, ſo eſſential to our manufactures, would be for ever loſt to us; for hitherto there has been no reaſon to believe, the iſland contains any adequate ſupply within itſelf. The two moſt obvious articles, among thoſe neceſſary to this country, are here ſpecified. The detail might be much enlarged, but as it is not at all the object of this publication to conſider any point not immediately connected with the military ſituation of the kingdom, no farther deduction ſhall be drawn from the foregoing premiſes, than, that a conqueſt of Ireland, and conſequent ſeparation from England, by a foreign enemy, would be the greateſt misfortune that could befal this iſland.

The ſurface of Ireland preſents a great tract of fertile land, in all its variations of paſture and tillage; but over this are interſperſed great tracts

of mountain. The flat and fertile lands are interſperſed with great tracts of bog, of which moſt are paſſable in ſome parts to infantry, but not to cavalry or to artillery; a difficulty which is however compenſated, in the infinity of moſt excellent roads, running in all directions to and from the coaſt to the capital, as well as croſs roads, interſecting them in every point. Lakes and chains of rapids, are another leading feature in the face of Ireland, and tho' the rivers are not large, yet as the banks are ſtrong and afford good poſitions, or if not ſtrong by elevation, are boggy, they are all of conſequence in a military view. But the great object in the map of Ireland, is the Shannon. This great chain of lakes, cuts off an entire province from the reſt of Ireland, and may be claſſed with the Elbe, and almoſt with the Rhine, whoſe banks furniſh ſo many important events in the military hiſtory of Europe.

The northern parts, and ſouth weſtern point, are the moſt mountainous, the others the moſt fertile parts of the iſland; theſe laſt produce that redundance of proviſions, which we export to other countries with ſo much profit to ourſelves; and of courſe, it is from theſe only that an army, friendly or hoſtile, can expect to draw ſubſiſtence.

Ireland has no woods; its fuel in the interior parts is entirely turf, and therefore it is neceſſary that an army ſhould be prepared to make uſe of that fuel, or ſo provide itſelf as not to ſtand in need of any, during the time of its abſence from its magazines.

The coaſts of Ireland are in general bold. All the weſtern, north weſtern, and ſouth weſtern parts have fine harbours, (thoſe in the Channel

are

are not ſo good) the weſt and ſouth weſterly winds prevail on thoſe coaſts, and the tide riſes every where to a conſiderable height. The coaſt counties are in general thinly peopled, producing conſiderable quantities of cattle, but not having many mills or ſtores, where any quantity of grain is laid up at a time, more than neceſſary for the actual reſidents from one year to another *. Therefore, if an enemy landed on thoſe coaſts, he would be obliged to ſubſiſt from the ſea, until he was able to penetrate into the interior of the country. From the indentations of the coaſts, they of courſe afford an enemy poſitions; theſe coaſts are generally leſs incloſed than the interior of the country, the face of which is divided into ſquares of larger or ſmaller ſize, by mounds of earth, a defence againſt any arms but artillery, and which literally make every field a redoubt: and this deſcription extends to all the cultivated part of the kingdom.

Its principal harbours are Cork, Bantry, Galway, and Lough Foyle, but the landing places are innumerable. Theſe harbours have bold ſhores, but as the tide riſes ſo high, there is always alſo a conſiderable extent of beach.

The inhabitants of Ireland conſiſt of thoſe reſident in the great towns; tradeſmen and manufacturers, who reſide in diſperſed cottages, in the parts of the iſland where the linen trade is carried on; and farmers and their labourers in the other parts †. The men of property, clergy and

* As there is a conſiderable export, there certainly are ſtores at the ſea ports. This obſervation muſt therefore not be taken in a ſtrict, but a relative or comparative ſenſe.

† Of theſe, the people of the lower orders in the North are of a military turn, capable of being immediately formed into

and gentry, are much thinner diſperſed thro' the country than in England; or, compared to the population, are in Scotland; and being at no pains to acquire it, are poſſeſſed of very little influence over the peaſantry. The towns are in general poor, of no natural ſtrength, nor are there any fortified; thoſe which had works around them were deſtroyed by Cromwell. The natural ſtrength of Ireland conſiſts in the face of the country, and the nature of the climate; it has no artificial ſtrength, but what it poſſeſſes in the navy of England.

into excellent ſoldiers. Thoſe of the reſt of the kingdom are utterly devoid of military ſpirit, depreſſed by poverty, except when they are goaded to ſome act of deſperation; but ſtill capable of being made to fight in defence of their homes and families, to which they are ſtrongly attached; a good militia might in time be formed of them.

## CHAP. II.

*On the Probability of an Attack by the French—In what Part they would moſt probably make it—On the Likelihood of Succeſs or Failure—With what Force.*

THE weſterly and ſouth weſterly winds, which blow nine months in the year, are favorable to a fleet ſailing from Breſt to the weſtern coaſt of Ireland, as thoſe very winds which bring them here, detain the Britiſh fleet in the Channel, and are equally obſtructive of any ſuccour arriving in Ireland from Liverpool, Whitehaven, or even Milford Haven. It is extraordinary that the advantage of making a naval depot at Milford Haven, and ſtationing a force there, has not ſtruck the Britiſh adminiſtration, as its capaciouſneſs and ſituation give it advantages over any port on that coaſt, for getting out into the Atlantic, the Bay of Biſcay, St. George's Channel, and the weſt and ſouth weſt of Ireland.

Breſt, taking it in a nautical point of view, is nearer Ireland by near one half than Plymouth; nor is there indeed any thing to be dreaded by this country, from any preparations in the French ports in the Channel, as any ſuch muſt be deſigned with a view againſt ſome other point of the Britiſh dominions.

From the preſent ſtate of affairs between England and France, it ſeems highly probable that the French will make an attack upon the Britiſh dominions in Europe. It is not probable that ſhe will leave England, if ſhe can help it, in a condition

dition at the peace to do her future injury; and it will always be the object of that country to crush England if she can. It is also probable that France may think, that as Ireland is the most vulnerable part of the British empire, so a blow there would be the most fatal to her. The system of carrying on war, which that nation has adopted, viz. of making attacks upon a number of points at the same time, would also be, in such a case, put in practice, and they would menace different parts of this coast, to distract our attention, at the same time that they could hold the troops on the south coast of England in check, by menacing that side, and the troops on the east and north from Holland. In so doing the grand fleet could hardly venture from the Channel. But if the main design of the enemy was against this country, their fleet would be at sea in the mouth of the Channel, to detain the British in port, or prevent their sending out detachments, or to give battle, in order to secure the debarkation on the south west, west or north of Ireland, while a squadron of frigates would station themselves in St. George's Channel, to intercept succours arriving from England.

It is probable that, for reasons which will be hereafter assigned, Galway would be considered by them as the most advantageous part to make a landing at, and that whatever other places they threatened would be only diversions.

These attacks must be either desultory and cursory, like those of Paul Jones, and the equally trivial, tho' more fatal ones, of ours on the coast of France; or they will be in great force for the purpose of conquest.

A great force would require such preparation, time, &c. as must make it known. To land fifty thousand

thouſand men, would require at leaſt two hundred ſail of tranſports, a convoy of ſeveral ſail of the line, twenty frigates, and as many veſſels of ſhallow draft carrying heavy guns to cover the debarkation. This would altogether conſtitute a fleet of at leaſt two hundred and fifty ſail, (for ſo ſhort a diſtance tranſports would convey many men) having on board forty thouſand infantry, three thouſand artillery, four thouſand mounted and diſmounted light cavalry and huſſars, a corps of pontoneers, engineers and marines, to ſerve in the gun boats, &c. making in all an army of fifty thouſand men; and it is probable, for the reaſons that will be hereafter aſſigned, that ſuch an attempt would not be made with a ſmaller force. If they have ſuch a fleet in the mouth of the Channel, as will hold the Britiſh in check *; or if they are determined to riſque an action, or if the Britiſh fleet cannot quit its poſt in the Channel, by reaſon of the manœuvres of the French on the oppoſite coaſt; or finally, if the wind is adverſe, in every one of theſe caſes, it is not only poſſible, but highly probable, that an enemy, ſuch as we have ſuppoſed, may arrive on our coaſt. It is likewiſe probable, that if the commanders took proper meaſures, it would

* Happily England has as yet a decided ſuperority at ſea, a ſuperiority ſhe may maintain many years; but notwithſtanding that, when the French fleet is in force, the Britiſh fleet cannot go out in detachments. It then becomes neceſſary to aſcertain what force France has at ſea, before Britain can ſend out hers, as the conſequence of meeting a decidedly ſuperior enemy might be fatal. So many accidents may intervene to cauſe delay in nautical affairs, that the blow may be ſtruck before the Britiſh fleet can arrive to give battle to the enemy. If that is done, the enemy runs into port, but if they muſt give battle, what is the worſt that can happen to them? the loſs of eight or ten ſhips of the line, manned with ſuch ſailors as theirs, compared to the conqueſt of Ireland! Once the invading army is put on ſhore, the Britiſh fleet can no longer protect; a deſcent may be effected without a ſuperiority at ſea, and that by a much more probable concurrence of fortuitous circumſtances, than that which enabled the French to penetrate into Holland.

not

not be poſſible to prevent their effecting a landing. Small forces never, and great ones ſeldom, have been prevented from doing ſo. A fleet of two hundred and fifty ſail, collected at Breſt, l'Orient, Rochefort, &c. would certainly be attended with many delays and accidents, and require much combination, ſo that more is left to hazard in its ſucceſs. And as it muſt be known, its deſtination may be nearly aſcertained, and in conſequence, the more precautions taken; not forgetting, however, that even if the deſign of an invaſion of Ireland were public, ſtill the exigencies of England might be ſo imperious as to preclude her from the poſſibility of detaching her grand fleet, in which caſe we muſt ſave ourſelves by our own exertions only.

But unfortunately our coaſts are not in a ſtate of defence, nor can they be put in one at the moment of danger; and ſo many parts would be threatened, as to render it impoſſible to venture to concentrate the force for the defence of the iſland in any one point; or if it were, probably it would be the wrong one; and to add to this, falſe attacks often, being neglected, become the true ones, as ſoon as it appears that they have a chance of ſucceeding.

It therefore follows, that were an attack on the coaſt of Ireland made, on the part of the French, ſuch an attack would ſo far ſucceed, as that the diſembarkation might be effected; and there is alſo reaſon to think, that of the many parts of the iſland where landing in great force is poſſible, Galway is the moſt practicable, becauſe the navigation is moſt favorable, as alſo, that the enemy could keep us longer in ſuſpenſe as to his real point of attack; beſides the peculiar advantages that bay offers, the excellent poſts its ſhores afford, and the facility with which an advance into, and conqueſt of, firſt the province of Connaught, and ſubſequently of the whole kingdom, might be effected.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

*Of the Form of Debarkation—and where it is, or is not to be, apprehended.*

IF a fleet, having arrived on our coaſt, intends to effect an abſolute conqueſt of the country, what becomes of the ſhipping which brought that force here, is a matter of little conſequence to the enemy; its buſineſs is to land the troops and ſtores, and not at all to re-embark them. As the object is the complete conqueſt of the iſland, and that cannot be effected until the capital is got poſſeſſion of, therefore they will of courſe endeavor to diſembark within as few days march of the capital as poſſible, adhering to that eſſential rule in the military art, viz. *to make the line of operations as ſhort as poſſible.* As this expreſſion may not be intelligible, except to military men, the following definition comprehends and explains its meaning, in as few words as it can well be put.

The line of operation of an army, is one drawn between the point againſt which it is deſtined, and that from whence it draws its ſubſiſtence; and this is the great and main groundwork of all plans of military movements, campaigns, &c.

But the neareſt part of the coaſt, where a landing can be effected, to Dublin, is Galway. If a hoſtile fleet, having on board a force ſuch as we have ſtated, arrives in Galway harbour, no force that could be ſent againſt it, could prevent its landing and occupying the town, and if neceſſary,

a poſition

a poſition from the ſea and their fleet on the right, to Lough Corrib on their left; there they could maintain themſelves, intrench their camp, ſecure their flanks, or indeed, if neceſſary, ſecure a retreat*.

Their frigates would probably make a diverſion in their favor, by threatening other parts of the coaſt. But the march by Bantry is longer, and thro' a difficult country, as it is alſo from Cork, and ſtill more ſo by Lough Foyle. The ſhorteſt and moſt eligible line of operation is by Galway, as in two days march they are at the Shannon; by getting poſſeſſion of which, they have all the province of Connaught ſecured to them, and in four days march they can be in poſſeſſion of Dublin.

But in caſe of a landing at Bantry Bay†, the enemy would probably advance in two columns, one againſt Cork ‖, the other againſt Limerick, where the country is ſtrong by nature, and the direct roads few, a ſituation which would expoſe them to conſiderable danger, if they had an officer oppoſite them, capable of taking advantage of it.

From theſe cities, an army endeavouring to gain Dublin, and the eaſt coaſt, for the double purpoſe of diſplacing the government, and making the coaſt their frontier againſt England, might march in two or more columns, as will be hereafter ſhewn.

* It is evident that ſeveral poſitions might be choſen there, where it would be impoſſible to turn their flanks or rere.

† Which, as it is poſſible, deſerves conſideration, more eſpecially alſo, as a co-operating force might be landed there by the enemy with very good effect, to cauſe a diverſion in favor of their grand attack in ſome other part.

‖ Which they would ſeize.

The

The country thro' which theſe armies would paſs, admits very well of a defenſive war, and like moſt of Ireland might be diſputed, therefore, ſhould the enemy make a landing in this country, it were to be wiſhed they ſhould attempt it in that part; but as we cannot hope much complaiſance from them, it is a duty we owe ourſelves, immediately to endeavor to ſecure thoſe parts which are vulnerable.

Troops would diſembark under cover of the artillery of their veſſels, if there was an army guarding the coaſt. If the oppoſition which they expected was trifling, they would probably come in with the tide to the ſhore; but if the troops appeared in force on the ſhore, and that it was alſo covered with works and cannon, they would then diſembark and form upon the beach, and advance againſt the coaſt in force. It is for this reaſon, high ſtrong tides and extenſive ſtrands, are favourable to the operations of the enemy. If about 1800 yards is the range of a cannon ſhot, they would march ſo far under cover of the guns of their fleet, to attack the force which would probably be formed on the coaſt; but if this coaſt were defended with works, they would probably endeavor to take them in flank *. Having gotten poſſeſſion of heights upon the coaſt, they would there throw up entrenchments, and proceed to land their ſtores.

* For on ſuch a one as is here deſcribed, an army diſembarking at low water could not poſſibly be attacked in their diſembarkation; and when in force, if the whole coaſt is not fortified and defended, it might as well not be ſo in any part, as they can advance in whatever direction they judge beſt.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the beſt Methods of oppoſing a Diſembarkation.*

MAIZEROY enters largely into the defence of a coaſt againſt incurſions, but avoids ſaying any thing relative to an invaſion in force, as ſuch an occurrence had not, like the other, come under his notice. Probably he did not chooſe to incur the riſque of reaſoning on what he had never ſeen; it is much eaſier certainly to write ſatisfactorily upon the one than upon the other.

Wherever a landing is to be apprehended, the whole of that coaſt ought to be well reconnoitred, and the water ſounded, and the poſitions for oppoſing the enemy choſen. The previous arrangements having been made, on his appearance on the coaſt, the troops deſtined for the defence of it ſhould immediately aſſemble at the appointed rendezvous.

If batteries, and the other works, have not been thrown up, they ought to be ſo. The enemy will land upon as level a ſhore as they can, under cover of their veſſels; the fire from their veſſels would probably be very great, ſuppoſe four hundred guns; it is therefore the object of the troops who defend, to cloſe upon the enemy immediately on their landing, as from that time their artillery, in which they will till then to a certainty be ſuperior, will be uſeleſs. Should they be driven back to their boats, the batteries muſt again open upon and endeavour to ſink them. Though troops diſembarking in a bay, where there are ſeveral landing places, poſſeſs an advantage over the defending army, inaſmuch as acting

acting on a ſmaller ſegment, they can maſk their real intention by feints, till it is too late to prevent them, and they act *from* a centre, whereas their opponents act *to* one, which is an advantage. If the enemy intrenches himſelf, and that the troops do not arrive in time to prevent that, yet before he advances, the intrenchments ought to be immediately ſtormed, and an attack by cannon upon the fleet from the heights at the ſame time, to diſtract their attention, and prevent their ſending ſuccours. If once driven from their intrenchments, their deſtruction ought to be the conſequence.

Yet two Tuſcan frigates at Algiers, by an enfilading fire, contrived to ſave the Spaniſh army; the retreat was covered by the grenadiers commanded by Col. O'Brien; only one ſhot was fired by them during the retreat, tho' the Algerine cavalry came up almoſt to their bayonets. The failure of that expedition was owing to the groſſeſt miſmanagement and ignorance.

The Algerines did not even appear on the coaſt. Inſtead of the firſt line, when landing, taking its poſition and intrenching itſelf, they did not wait for the diſembarkation of the ſecond line, and were defeated before that joined them. Againſt ſuch a place as Algiers, even had they gained an advantage in landing, nothing of conſequence could have been effected. It was an abſurd ſcheme, ignorantly executed. In a landing, not leſs than ten thouſand ſhould diſembark at a time; they ſhould advance in as many columns as poſſible, and occupy the firſt heights, from which they ſhould on no account whatever advance a ſtep, but intrench themſelves there.

The miſconduct of thoſe who commanded our expeditions on the coaſt of France, in Lord Chatham's

Chatham's time, was ſuch, that it is ſaid they once encamped with their front to the ſea and their rere to the enemy, probably " *par ſigne de mepris.*"

Such incurſions anſwer no end, but the deſtruction of thoſe engaged in them, as at St. Cas, unleſs there is well-grounded hope that the people of the country would be on the ſide of the invader.

If the defending army can make no impreſſion on the enemy, its artillery and baggage, &c. muſt be ſent up the country; and it muſt divide itſelf for the purpoſe of obſerving the motions of the enemy, and taking poſitions to obſtruct his march to the capital, until more or ſufficient force aſſembles.

CHAP.

## CHAP. V.

*Campaigns of Schomberg—William III.—and Ginkle, in Ireland.*

WILLIAM having driven James from England, this iſland became the theatre of the war, which was conducted with conſiderable talents on both ſides, and had not it been for the puſillanimity of James, it might have taken a very different turn from what it did; but the mere preſence of that weak and headſtrong Monarch, was ſufficient to blaſt his fortune, and his friends' hopes.

Schomberg landed at the head of twelve thouſand men, in Auguſt 1689, without meeting any oppoſition, in Carrickfergus Bay. With the aſſiſtance of ſix ſhips of war, he took poſſeſſion of that town, and on his advancing into the country, the poſitions taken by the hoſtile armies were as follow: Schomberg occupied a poſition at Dundalk, which he found himſelf obliged to fortify. Roſen threatened his right flank, and James, with about thirty thouſand men, was poſted on the Boyne at Drogheda. Thus James had Schomberg there in a *cul-de-ſac*, his retreat cut off, his army waſting by ſickneſs, ſhut up in intrenchments, and James himſelf with a ſuperior army in their front. He made a feeble and characteriſtic attempt to vanquiſh Schomberg by treachery, and even then, when nothing more was wanting to the deſtruction of his enemy's army, but James' giving the word to attack, his

reſolution failed, and he retired to his former poſition, letting Schomberg eſcape, and retreat unmoleſted.

June 1690, William landed with 36,000 men, and marched along the eaſtern coaſt toward the capital, drawing his ſupplies from his fleet. James's army, conſiſting of 30,000 men, lay in their poſition as before deſcribed, at Drogheda, and he was now obliged, contrary to his inclination, to venture an action. James's poſition was well choſen; his right appuyé on Drogheda, which he occupied, his front to the Boyne, fordable, but deep, with ſtrong banks, which were interſected by mounds of earth, hedges and ditches, his army preſented a front of about three miles, extending towards Slane, where was a bridge, which he neglected to occupy; the river toward the centre of James's poſition forms a conſiderable projecting bend, and another in reverſe higher up toward Slane. This is important, as the fate of the battle was in a great degree decided by its locality, the effect of which, on the manœuvres of the two armies, was ſtrongly marked in the courſe of the day; for it is to be obſerved, both parties had neglected to occupy the paſs of Slane. William advanced in three columns to the oppoſite banks of the river, reconnoitred and adjuſted his plan of operation, determining to attack by the right and centre. Accordingly, in the morning, he detached a corps to paſs by Slane; this corps arrived ſooner at its deſtination than that ſent by James (who ſaw his error too late) to anticipate it, which by the curve of the river was forced to make a conſiderable detour, whereby time, as we have ſtated, was given to William's detachment to arrive and ſeize the paſs before them; having croſſed which, and formed, they advanced

vanced on the left of James's army, and extending to the right, turned it, notwithſtanding a moraſs in its front, by which manœuvre it was compelled to fall back in confuſion toward Duleek. William had ſo combined his attacks, that his centre was to paſs at the time his right ſhould have completely engaged the left of James's army. When that, therefore, was ſeen to have taken place, his centre column advanced againſt Old-Bridge, and his left to the fords, which having paſſed, and gained the oppoſite bank at the projecting curve of the Boyne, they there formed, and received an attack from the right and centre of James, which they repulſed, and advanced. The Iriſh army fell back above two miles, to Donore, where they formed, and advanced again to the charge; but William's cavalry having, according to their orders, completely turned their left, the fortune of the day could not be recovered, and they were forced to fall back, purſued with loſs, to Duleek, behind which they again rallied.

This is one of the moſt intereſting actions recorded in hiſtory. James's poſition was well choſen; his great and glaring miſconduct was in not occupying the paſs of Slane with a ſtrong corps of infantry and artillery, covered by works. This was the key to his poſt, and had it been properly guarded, William could not have forced his poſition; but when he had turned James's left, it enabled him, after his centre had croſſed the Old-Bridge, to deploy it; for James's centre was obliged to fall back, ſeeing the enemy's cavalry on their flank ‖. The cavalry was not

 then

‖ No ſucceſs gained by James's right and centre, could alter the events of that day. Had they even thrown their opponents back into the river, ſtill William's advancing on their

then what it is now, but that of both armies were much on a par. Tho' the country was unfavourable for that army, yet they decided the day, both here and at Aughrim. Had Slane been occupied, William muſt have gone higher up the Boyne in order to have paſſed. It appears a great neglect on the part of William, not to have intercepted the Iriſh army at Duleek. They muſt have ſurrendered or been driven into the ſea. Probably he did not wiſh to be embarraſſed with James as a priſoner, following the proverb adopted from the Spaniards, "*A l'ennemi qui ſe retire un pont d'or.*" (The French do not ſeem to have followed that maxim this war, except in the inſtance of the Duke of Brunſwick.) James was glad to have an excuſe for flying to Verſailles. From this time James's army acted without a plan; but they were reduced to deſperation. The reſource they adopted of retiring behind the Shannon was a good one; William's followed them in a diſorderly manner. Grace who commanded in Athlone, had occupied the town weſt of the Shannon, with four thouſand men, ſupported by another corps in the neighbourhood. Douglas attempted to reduce it with a battery of ſix guns; this not ſucceeding to his wiſhes, he retreated with diſgrace.

their flank, which was uncovered, could not be remedied. The attack by Slane was the grand manœuvre. The attacks of the centre and left were only ſecondary ones. In this action the great ſyſtem was diſplayed; the right attacking, the left refuſing itſelf. Two detachments ſent to ſeize a paſs, the intermediate ground favors one more than the other. It arrives in time to form and drive in its opponent. Had James ſeized the paſs, he could have turned William's right, while in the act of fording the river, had he ventured to do it.

Mean

Mean time, William laid ſiege to Limerick, where Sarsfield performed a gallant action with a corps of cavalry. He made a detour, croſſed the Shannon at Killaloe, came in the rere of William's army within about ſeven miles, and intercepted and deſtroyed a convoy of artillery, who thought themſelves in perfect ſafety ſo near their own camp. Limerick made a gallant defence, and William was forced to retreat. Sept. 29th, the Duke of Marlborough landed at Cork with five thouſand men. Having increaſed it to about ten thouſand, he took Cork and Kinſale.

Previous to the campaign of 1691, the Iriſh and their French allies poſſeſſed all the country weſt of the Shannon, with the important garriſons of Limerick and Athlone, and were entire maſters of the whole of the Shannon. Ginkle having withdrawn into winter cantonments, was obliged to confine himſelf ſolely to the protection of the Engliſh frontier, as it was called, which was continually and vexatiouſly harraſſed by incurſions from the oppoſite ſide of the Shannon. To add to its misfortunes, bodies of undiſciplined and inſubordinate armed men, taking the advantage of the unhappy times, plundered and murdered on all ſides, under the names of Volunteers and Rapparees, ſo called from the ſpecies of weapon which they were armed with, a kind of ſpear or pike, the firſt that occurs and eaſieſt ſupplied. Theſe wretches having been already robbed, firſt by James's, and if they eſcaped them, by William's army, deprived thereby of the means of ſubſiſtence, were forced to take to a life of robbery, and wandered under theſe names in gangs; the men armed, and followed by their wives and families, whom they eaſily trained to the buſineſs.

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James's army, elated at having forced William to retreat, and indeed with reaſon, as it was nearly equivalent to depriving him of all the fruits of his victory; for, in reality, he gained nothing by it but Dublin, and a deſolated country, to harraſs their enemy, and alſo with more ſanguine views, projected an attack on Mullingar, and to further it, occupied and fortified the town of Ballimore, which is ſituated half way between Mullingar and Athlone; but Ginkle, thinking it neceſſary to prevent their eſtabliſhing themſelves at Mullingar, advanced againſt them and drove them from it, (it has been aſſerted the Iriſh pointed their palliſades the wrong way.) Ginkle purſued them to Grenogue, where they attempted a ſtand in front of the town, but were driven thro' it, and purſued to the very walls of Athlone. The whole of this conduct on the part of the Iriſh was erroneous, as they ought ſolely to have occupied themſelves in ſtrengthening their frontier behind the Shannon, augmenting the fortifications of Athlone and Limerick, and beating up Ginkle's quarters, whoſe army, diſpirited and unhealthy, in bad winter quarters, would have melted away before the campaign began.

In ſpring, St. Ruth, a French general, ſent over by that court, took the command, contrary to the feelings of the gallant Sarsfield, who deſerved better treatment. St. Ruth was a man of abilities; like his countrymen, ardent, vehement, and attached to his own opinions, with a ſovereign contempt of the perſons and talents of thoſe with whom he was to act, who were not of his nation. He brought ſome French officers with him, who came fraught with the ſame contempt of the natives, by whom they were univerſally

verſally hated. It is probable they did more harm to that cauſe than good; diſunion and jealouſy immediately ſhewed themſelves. Tho' the French court ſent officers, they did not ſend either money, or any other requiſite; but James's army, tho' thus abandoned by their allies, did not deſpair, but were, on the contrary, much elated by their late ſucceſſes. St. Ruth ſoon decided on his plan of operations, which was, to occupy the frontier preſented by the river Shannon, by taking his poſition in a central point near Athlone. A great overſight was committed by St. Ruth, in not withdrawing their force from Ballymore, a place at that time of no conſequence to them; but they ſuffered Ginkle, on his advance, to take a thouſand of his beſt troops, then in garriſon there, priſoners; a circumſtance attended with peculiar bad conſequence at the opening of the campaign, as it raiſed the ſpirits of the other army, and damped thoſe of their own.

Ginkle advanced toward Athlone, and reconnoitring the army of St. Ruth, found it poſted on a neck of land between two bogs, about two miles beyond the Shannon. He carried the part of the town of Athlone, on the eaſt ſide of the river, without difficulty. St. Ruth's army retired to the other, breaking down the bridges. Ginkle ſaw the danger and difficulty that was likely to attend the attempt to paſs the river, under the guns of a fortreſs, and in front of a formidable enemy. He therefore formed a plan for that purpoſe, by ſtealing a march, and throwing a bridge of boats over it above Lough Ree, at Laneſboro', but by his enemy's vigilance, the ſcheme was diſcovered and foiled.

He then determined to force his paſſage in the place he occupied, and after ſome attempts ſucceeded

ceeded in repairing the bridge which St. Ruth's army in their retreat had broke down. Having done which, he ordered his right column to attack by the bridge, and the left and centre to ford the river. St. Ruth, however, burnt the bridge, and Ginkle was obliged to countermand the attack; and ſaw himſelf reduced to the deſperate neceſſity of retreating to Dublin, thro' a deſolated country, expoſed to the harraſſing of an exulting enemy. It is not often that a council of war gives its opinion for battle; the foreſeeing and ſtarting difficulties, is the affectation of ſuperior wiſdom; yet it happened that Ginkle's council did adopt the boldeſt, and as it generally is the wiſeſt meaſure, for a failure in it could not put them in a worſe ſituation than they were. This was, for the immediate attack. Two thouſand men, divided into three columns, advanced to ſtorm the town, which was defended by about an equal number. Some reſiſtance was made; but the gallantry of the centre column, who paſſed the ford under a moſt heavy fire, and entered the town, driving the enemy before them, enabled the other two columns to eſtabliſh themſelves alſo, within the walls. St. Ruth committed an unpardonable error, in his neglect of this poſt, as the event ſhewed.

St. Ruth was obliged, by this ſucceſs, to change his poſition, in order to cover and keep his communication open with Limerick. He therefore retreated down the courſe of the Shannon, and took a poſition behind the river Suck; his right toward the Shannon, occupying the heights called Kilcommedin Hill, upon a front of two miles; his left, ſecured by a rivulet and a bog, which alſo covered his front, as far as a paſs on a chain of ſmall hills, which lay oppoſite his right. Here

he

he determined to wait the attack of the Britiſh.

St. Ruth's army conſiſted of about twenty-four thouſand men, William's of about eighteen thouſand. Ginkle having called in all his detachments, on the 12th of July, 1692, attacked with his left; the cavalry marched by the paſs before-mentioned and deployed, covering the left flank of his infantry, as they advanced upon the enemy, who retired gradually from ditch to ditch before them. As the infantry advanced in this difficult ground, where their cavalry could not protect them, they began to find themſelves enfiladed, and flanked from behind the hedges on their left; for gaps having been cut, at proper intervals, in the banks and ditches, the enemy had by that means got upon their flank. This gave them a check. St. Ruth, wiſhing to follow up his blow there, and ſeeing nothing to apprehend upon his left, drew away his cavalry from thence, in the intention of bringing it upon the left of Ginkle. There was a narrow paſs by the caſtle of Aughrim, in front of St. Ruth's left. Ginkle ordered his right wing to attack St. Ruth's left, which was now expoſed, and to defile by this paſs, and form on the other ſide; the right of his infantry advancing thro' the bog, ſo as to form on the oppoſite ſide, by the time the cavalry of the right had formed its line. Talmaſh, who commanded it, executed the manœuvre with ability, and led his corps in a column between the caſtle and the bog, formed on the other ſide, and advanced juſt in time to ſave the centre of the Britiſh line of infantry, which having waded thro' the bog, had attacked and driven the Iriſh line before them; but falling into confuſion in advancing, the Iriſh had rallied, and charging them in turn,

had

had driven them back with great loſs, into the bog. Juſt at this critical inſtant, Ginkle's cavalry, ſhewing themſelves, checked St. Ruth's line, and gave time to his infantry, (who had gone beyond their orders, which were, not to advance upon the enemy, until they ſaw their right wing of cavalry entirely paſſed the caſtle,) to rally under the ditches at the bog's edge, and being re-formed, to advance in good order, with the cavalry upon their right, upon the left of the enemy. St. Ruth, to whom the appearance of Ginkle's right wing of cavalry, ſo near his line, was a ſurprize, not expecting to have had both his flanks attacked, was bringing up a reſerve of cavalry, for the purpoſe of falling on Ginkle's right, when he was killed by a cannon ſhot.

This fortunate ſhot probably cauſed the gaining the battle. St. Ruth had the advantage upon the right, where the firſt attack had been made. Ginkle's infantry were exhauſted, by wading thro' a bog up to their middles; they had been driven back into that bog with loſs and confuſion, and St. Ruth was at that moment coming down upon their right flank, with a freſh body of cavalry. So far every thing was in his favor.

But St. Ruth communicated with no one; by this conduct he loſt Athlone. To Sarsfield, his ſecond in command, he had a particular pique. His whole arrangements were confined to his own head; and Sarsfield, who ſucceeded to the command, was in utter ignorance of what was going on about him, except of that which immediately concerned his own poſt: Of courſe, on the fall of St. Ruth, every thing was at a ſtop, the officers waiting for orders, and no one to give them. In conſequence, his army firſt retreated, preſſed by Ginkle, and then fled.

The

The infantry, in their uſual cuſtom, to a bog *, the cavalry to Loughrea. Thus ended the battle of Aughrim, and with it the hopes of thoſe who had attached themſelves to James.

Ginkle's poſition, previous to the attack, was on the Suck, near Ballinaſloe, oppoſite St. Ruth's. St. Ruth's main errors, every one of which was ſufficient to have cauſed the loſs of the battle, were, Firſt, not communicating with Sarsfield: Secondly, not fortifying the paſs on his right, which would have prevented Ginkle's cavalry from paſſing there, and of courſe, the neceſſity of his unfurniſhing his left: Thirdly, not attacking the right wing of Talmaſh, while in the act of deploying, after paſſing by the caſtle of Aughrim, a manœuvre, that by the foregoing account, muſt have taken up a conſiderable time.

Had the Britiſh army been defeated, St. Ruth, by croſſing the Shannon, might have taken a poſition on their rere, and deſtroyed their whole army. His poſition was choſen with great ſkill, and his army ſeem to have maintained their ground with great firmneſs. On the other hand, the manœuvres of William' army were conducted in a manner that evinced much talents on the part of the generals. It is an extraordinary circumſtance, that in ſuch ground, the event of the action at Aughrim, (as well as at Drogheda) ſhould have been turned by the cavalry.

St. Ruth was every where himſelf during the action, but always a little too late. He was one of thoſe men who never think any thing

* A letter, giving an account of the battle of Kilruſh, where Lord Mountgarret's army was defeated by the Earl of Ormond, ſays, that the adjacent bog was black, (the colour of their cloathing) with the multitude who fled to it, out of reach of the cavalry.

properly

properly done, except what they do themſelves. The army's retiring to Loughrea, after the defeat, was merely accidental. Had Sarsfield's army retired to Galway, they might probably have done better there than at Limerick. Probably they would have compelled Ginkle to divide his force. At any rate, either Galway or Limerick muſt have been in his rere. Had Ginkle left him there, he would have loſt Connaught again; and had he beſieged him there, the garriſon of Limerick might have made a diverſion in his favour; beſides, Sarsfield's army was ſtill numerous. St. Ruth took one precaution, which never ought to be omitted in ſimilar circumſtances. Ditches and banks become an inconvenience to an army, if they cramp its manœuvres. Whenever the ſituation is ſuch, debouchures ſhould be cut in them, in thoſe places where they are beſt protected by croſs fire. They ſhould be ſufficiently large for troops to paſs on a conſiderable front, and might be cloſed againſt cavalry by chevaux de frize.

If Sarsfield had retreated to Galway, Ginkle could not have left him behind. The campaign was then far advanced, and would ſtill have had Limerick to reduce; and an advanced ſeaſon in the field is always fatal to foreigners in this country.

Ginkle marched by the Munſter ſide of the Shannon, and occupied the ground before Limerick, which the King had done the year before, on the ſide of Ireton's Fort. He now ſecured all the paſſes on the Shannon, the neceſſity of which he had been taught the laſt campaign. Perceiving he could not hope to take the place, without completely inveſting it, he paſſed in the night above the town, by an iſland, to a part of the river

river which is fordable, and which he gained by the connivance of the officer appointed to guard it, with a corps of dragoons, as was the cuſtom of that time; for they had uſually a great and over-proportion of cavalry, to their infantry, and were, conſequently, obliged often to employ the cavalry, upon ſervices to which they were not adapted. As for inſtance, leaving the entire guard of a ford to them, if attacked, they cannot maintain their poſt. A good detachment of infantry, with ſome works mounted with guns, are the proper defence of a ford, as well as of a bridge.

Ginkle having completely inveſted, blockaded the town to the 22d September. It is extraordinary, during this time, no attempt was made to deſtroy the bridge of communication, and attack the forces on one ſide of the river, when ſeparated; but in general, an army which is diſcouraged by a ſeries of ill ſucceſs, *Ne s'occupe* (as the King of Pruſſia ſaid of his officers) *qu'à parer les bottes que leur font les autres*; obſerving at the ſame time, *Mais je mettrai bientot ordre à cela*, which he did, and turned the tide in his favor. On the 22d, Ginkle ſtormed the works of Thomond bridge. On the 23d, the garriſon beat a parley, and by the ſurrender of this city, the conqueſt of the kingdom was completed.

Theſe three campaigns in Ireland, are the only part of its military hiſtory, which are in any way intereſting. At that time the grand principles of war were underſtood; and altho' the improvement of tactics, of which Pruſſia ſet the example, by introducing the true principles of the Greeks, has within the laſt fifty years, by its refinements and multiplied combinations, completely ſet aſide the old ſyſtem of warfare, yet the great princi-

ples

ples muſt ever remain, in the ſame manner as architecture may derive benefit from the improvements of handicraft, tho' the ſublime principles of Euclid, on which its rules are founded, muſt ever remain invariable.

In theſe campaigns, ability was ſhewn on both ſides. William was a military monarch, commanding a veteran army. James was the very reverſe, commanding, or (to ſpeak more properly) at the head of undiſciplined forces, divided by different intereſts and views, while the faction and animoſity of individuals tore them to pieces. The French affected and felt a contempt, which they did not ſeek to diſguiſe, for the Iriſh, and the Iriſh retaliated in hatred to their haughty auxiliaries. Indeed, the Iriſh ſeem to have acted better from the time the French troops withdrew.

A few obſervations upon the general conduct of the campaign, may not be impertinent, as they will tend to throw into one view, a ſeries of military events, highly intereſting to the Iriſh nation at the preſent day, when a formidable enemy is at their very doors, and when there is reaſon to apprehend, that if not this, the next enſuing campaign, may bring the theatre of the war into our iſland.

Schomberg landed at Carrickfergus, (as Thurot afterwards did) without oppoſition, in the year 1689, with about ten thouſand men. Having augmented his army, he advanced to Dundalk; while James lay in an apathy, with treble his force, at Drogheda.

Why James's generals did not take a poſition at Newry, is unaccountable; there they might have deſtroyed the Britiſh army. Again at Dundalk, they had them, as it were, in a net. Yet

Yet even the hopes of treachery, could not induce James to make a real attack upon Schomberg. If he had done it, his correſpondence with certain parts of that army, would have been attended, probably, with good effect to him; but he did not get near enough to the conſpiracy, to be able to make it explode; as if there was any hope of ſucceſs in war, without incurring ſome danger.

In the campaign of 1690, Schomberg was ſuperſeded by William himſelf, who commanded a fine army of 36,000 men, well appointed and inured to ſervice, and who had, in addition to thoſe advantages, the higheſt confidence in their commander. James ſtill occupied his poſition near Drogheda.

William, with his ſuperior force, was right to come to an action. His opponent's poſition was well choſen, but the locality was not taken ſufficient advantage of. The ſaliant curve of the Boyne was not fortified; Slane was not occupied. William might have been forced to have looked for a paſſage higher up the Boyne; but tho' he would have effected it, yet delay was injurious to him, whoſe preſence was called for in other places, and might have beneficial to James.

William could have finiſhed the campaign in Ireland, after his victory at the Boyne, by ſeizing the paſs of Duleek *. Probably, had he done ſo,

* Some generals ſeem to think, the only conſequence to be drawn from a victory, is, to ſing Te Deum. The late Marſhal Daun was remarkable for his fondneſs for this church muſic. Sooner than omit it, he ſuffered the whole Pruſſian army to eſcape, after their defeat at Kollin. Laudohn, then a Lieut. Col. of Croats, being youngeſt in the council of war, gave his opinion for immediately puſhing on a corps to ſeize a paſs, which, if pre-occupied, no Pruſſian

ſo, he would not have been able to avoid taking James priſoner, and he did not wiſh to be embarraſſed with him. It may be ſo inferred, from the little trouble he took to follow him.

After the defeat at the Boyne, the Iriſh army retired behind the Shannon. This was well judged. Limerick was ſo well defended, William was obliged to raiſe the ſiege. Next year Ginkle took it, for which he was indebted to the deſperate ſituation of James's affairs, and, in conſequence thereof, the diſtracted ſtate of the garriſon. Athlone was taken in a gallant manner, owing to the infatuation of St. Ruth. Still a victory was neceſſary to give William a decided ſuperiority, and Ginkle was obliged to hazard a battle at Aughrim, where the ſituation of the Britiſh was ſuch, that a defeat would to them have been utter ruin.

James's army made good uſe of the ditches and incloſures, in their poſitions; but the bayonet was not ſo well underſtood then as it is now; and wherever troops are ſo poſted, they ſhould be attacked with that arm. Moſt attacks upon intrenchments have ſucceeded, and the reaſon is obvious: an army is generally diſtributed thro' the extent of an intrenchment, and is equally weak every where. The aſſailants, on the contrary, concentrate their force upon certain points, which are carried before the other party can throw in a ſufficient force to counterpoize them, and

ſian could ever have reached their own country. Had the advice of a Croat been followed on that day, his preſent Majeſty of Pruſſia would not, probably, have been enabled to play ſo important a part, on the political theatre of Europe, as has lately fallen to him. His glorious predeceſſor's courſe was near terminated. The Auſtrians of that time uſed to affect to call him, faſtidiouſly, *Le petit Marquis de Brandenburgh.*

and once the intrenchments are entered, the flank and rere of the army is expoſed; nor can they make a change of poſition as they could in the open field, but are tied down to one plan of operation. The only poſſible way of guarding againſt theſe inconveniencies, is by having great reſerves, but then you muſt contract your intrenchments, and if the flanks are not ſecured by the natural poſition, that is hard to be done, without falling into other difficulties.

The feelings of the human mind alſo operate. The man who ſtands behind the breaſt-work, contemplates his enemy advancing. He apprehends, that if he once enters the intrenchment, there is no chance of his ſafety, but by flight. He has time to make all theſe kind of natural reflections. The aſſailant, on the contrary, kept in motion, is animated; he looks on his arrival in the works, as the period of his danger; he therefore ruſhes on, and generally ſucceeds. The French have, this war, made a gallant defence of intrenchments; but they have the advantages of artillery ſcience and diſcipline, united with incredible numbers and enthuſiaſm; a rare combination! In general, a chain of ſtrong redoubts and fleches, are preferable to lines. It is more difficult to run away from them. That a fewer number can thus defend an equal extent of ground, they muſt be ſo near as to ſupport each other mutually. Another advantage which attends them is, that they leave the ground open for the army to manœuvre, as occaſion requires. They can advance to take an advantage of any confuſion into which the enemy may be thrown; and if requiſite, retire behind the redoubts again; all which, lines will not permit.

It was well judged of Ginkle, after paſſing the bog in the front of the enemy, at Aughrim, to order the infantry to form under the firſt enclo-ſures or ditches; but the Iriſh committed an over-ſight, in leaving any ſuch between them and the bog unoccupied; as they ſhould have levelled all ſuch, had they time enough. St. Ruth does not ſeem to have taken much pains to ſtrengthen his poſition. He loſt the battle of Aughrim by the ſame failing which had before loſt him Ath-lone; a pertinacious confidence in his own opi-nion, and contempt for the judgment of others.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VI.

*On an armed Yeomanry—Cavalry—And Free Corps of Infantry.*

IT were much to be wiſhed, that the plan of arming the yeomanry, and forming them into corps of cavalry, had been adopted; but it ought to be with much precaution. The principal precaution ſhould be, not to have too many corps, and to pay great attention to having them in good hands. They ſhould not be compoſed of too great a number of privates; as for inſtance, the reſidence of every yeoman ſhould be within ſeven miles of the place of rendezvous, in the centre of the whole; nor ſhould their number be too ſmall, as to every corps there ought to be five officers, reſident gentlemen of influence and property. In caſe of the death or reſignation of the captain, the next officer in command ſhould invariably ſucceed him. People like thoſe of whom ſuch corps ought to be compoſed, would be diſguſted and quit, were they to be turned over from one commandant to another, with as little ceremony as regulars; and the man who has moſt intereſt at court, has not always moſt intereſt in the country, *however high he may repreſent his own conſequence there.*

There is not a county in Ireland, which could not make up two ſuch corps of one hundred yeomen each. Some could make up five hundred; but reckoning one with another, at three hun-

dred to each county, it would make up a body of nine thouſand ſix hundred cavalry, maintained without expence to government, ready to take the field at a day's notice, and fit for any ſervice cavalry could be employed in.

Great care muſt be taken in giving the command of theſe corps. If they were given to any but men of liberal principles, it would do more harm than good; a ſpirit of party would govern in the ſelection of the corps; this baneful ſpirit is the deſtruction of all ſecurity in Ireland. All feaſting, electioneering, and diſſipation, ſhould alſo be avoided. The leſs they become either ſoldiers or gentlemen, the better. The pride and glory of England is its yeomanry; it was always ſo ſince the emancipation of the lower orders from villanage. In Ireland, one or two counties excepted, there has hardly hitherto been any ſuch, till within this century, but they are now increaſing, conſidering them as a body. In Wicklow and Wexford there is a yeomanry that would not diſgrace any ſhire in England.

What makes a yeoman reſpectable, is the honeſt pride of conſcious independence. The ſenſe of his happy ſituation attaches him to his native ſoil, and the conſtitution of his country, conſequently, the yeomen of England have always been found the moſt difficult to be ſeduced by the ſpirit of innovation. An obſerver of the Iriſh nation, will not perceive much of the foregoing character here; but it depends upon the gentlemen (not the little *ſoi diſant* gentleman, the greateſt tyrant and enemy the poor man has, but) the gentlemen of landed property, to create them; it is only giving them a valuable intereſt in their ſmall farms. When ſuch a thing is ſo eaſily done, one would think that the example of

of the world, and the preſent times, ought to make them ſet about it in earneſt. Mr. Arthur Young, in his tour thro' Ireland, ſaw, and has pointedly and truly detailed the grievance, and the real cauſe of it; and ſupplies ſome excellent hints to the gentlemen of Ireland. The poor man pays the taxes and tithes, his penury ſupports the ſplendor of the great, and ultimately he is the man to whom the defence of the country muſt be intruſted; for it is evident that nothing but imminent danger can arouſe the rich, and that does not appear to be a * ſtrong inducement to them to take arms in their hands; or if they were willing to fight for their properties, the number is too ſmall to do it with any effect. For their own ſafety they ought then to put betimes thoſe arms in the hands of a claſs of men, in whom they can confide, and not truſt their all to the honor and ſelf-denial of the outcaſts of mankind, of men, whoſe ſituation any change whatſoever muſt better, and who know it. The beſt defence any country can have, is a happy, patriotic, and uncorrupted yeomanry. A national debt, and the concomitant evil of revenue laws, have not improved the morals of the people of England and Ireland, but are, on the contrary, it is to be feared, daily ſapping the vitals and the ſtrength of the empire †.

* They called *la rue ducale*, at Bruſſels, in the time of Dumourier's incurſion, *la rue des lievres*.

† The exciſe is fattened with the rich reſult
Of all this riot; and ten thouſand caſks,
For ever dribling out their baſe contents,
Touch'd by the Midas finger of the ſtate,
Bleed gold for miniſters to ſport away.

COWPER.

The

The eſtabliſhment of theſe corps of yeomanry cavalry, ſhould be as follows: To be commanded by five gentlemen of property; one captain, two lieutenants, and two ſub-lieutenants, and to conſiſt of one hundred rank and file, compoſed of gentlemen, perſons of independent income, or in trade; farmers and their ſons, or near relatives, altho' not actually in poſſeſſion of farms; each maſter of a horſe. The arms, appointments, ſaddles and bridles to be ſupplied by government; the clothes by themſelves. Their clothing ſhould conſiſt of a round hat with a narrow brim; a frize coat, buttoning down to the waiſt, and waiſtcoat; a frize looſe coat, carried on the pummel of the ſaddle; leather breeches; boots coming well up to the knees; a pair of ſtrong ticken overhoſe, coming half way down the leg; a ſtraight one-edged ſword, three feet from the pummel to the point, which muſt be ſharp, in an iron ſcabbard*, like that of the Auſtrian cavalry, hanging in a waiſt-belt; one long piſtol in the left holſter, and four piſtol cartridges in a magazine with the holſter; in the other holſter two horſe ſhoes and two ſets of nails; a haverſack with a ſtiff leather bottom, to uſe as a noſe bag, ſhould be all their baggage.

Theſe corps ſhould aſſemble on Sundays after ſervice, and on holidays, to practiſe moving in ſquadron, charging, breaking into file, and forming ſquadron from that to right and left, front and rere. They ſhould alſo practiſe the ſword, &c. the manner of poſting videttes, patrolling a country, eſcorting a convoy, repeating ſignals, breaking, diſperſing and forming, and alſo learn how to croſs an encloſed country.

* Wooden ſcabbards break, and leather one's ſhrink and become uſeleſs.

When

*This Plate Represents a Yeoman, Mounted and fully Appointed.*

When an enemy is even in the country, theſe corps ought not to be called into the field. When embodied, there would be full uſe for them in their reſpective counties, by employing them, guarding magazines, convoys, aſſiſting the quarter-maſters and officers of ſtores in providing forage and proviſions, and in maintaining internal peace. They ſhould do orderly duty, if in the field, and be alſo cantoned about the army, but not commanded but by their own officers. They would probably in general act in ſmall corps of twenty-five each, commanded by a lieutenant. While theſe corps remain in their counties, an officer reſident in the county for the purpoſe, and appointed by government, ſhould make quarterly inſpections of the troops, drawing the whole together for one day; this would give them a ſpirit of emulation; and he ſhould report the ſtrength and ſtate of each troop, and the condition of their arms and appointments, for which each captain ſhould be anſwerable. When employed, they ſhould receive a high pay, 2s. 6d. a day, and draw rations for themſelves and horſes. Such a corps would be intimately acquainted with the paſſes, roads, &c. of their reſpective counties, and would be invaluable ſources of information for the generals.

They could detect any treachery on the part of the country people, over whom, on account of the claſs from which they are drawn, they would have a much greater influence than any troops, ſolely military, could have. The pay ſeems high, but it muſt be made worth their while to quit their homes and occupations; beſides, they could not in their way live as cheap, by forming meſſes, &c. as the military do. The evolutions of ſuch a corps ought, as above ſtated,

to

to be as ſimple as poſſible. Every thing ſhould be done by file. The ſquadrons to act on a ſmall front. The formations from file may be ſimplified as follows, and which contains every poſſible formation:

The ſquadron ſhould always file from the right, conſequently have it in front. To form from file to the front, each man moves rapidly up on the left of his file-leader, and dreſſes to the right. To form to the rere, the leading file of front rank turns to the left about and halts, his rere-rank-man covering him. Each file gallops on till they come on his left, then turn to the left about, cloſe, and dreſs to the right. To form to the right, the right file turns to his right, the reſt paſs in his rere, turn to the right and dreſs. To form to the left, the whole have only individually to turn to the left, dreſs, and cloſe to the right. Theſe ſimple evolutions, with the charge, and wheeling in ſquadron, and going about by ſubdiviſion, are all that are neceſſary for ſuch a corps to know, and this they might be taught in a week.

A corps of Hulans, which were in the ſervice of the King of Poland, anſwered very well the idea of a yeomanry cavalry, and their eſtabliſhment might be with little variation adopted here. They were Tartars and Mahomedans. The gentleman ſerved in the front rank, and carried a lance with a vanderole, and a ſabre; his ſervant covered him in the rere rank, armed with a carbine and ſabre. The uſe of the lance for the cavalry is not ſufficiently underſtood. Great advantages may be derived from it, either in the charge or purſuit. The Coſſacks uſe them in paſſing rivers; they ſound the depth of the water before them with the but of the lance.

Corps

*This Plate represents an armed Peasant fully appointed for the Field, his long Musquet rested in the Act of Firing, his Capote rolled on his back, and his Sword in its proper place, together with his Canteen and haversack for holding his provisions.*

Corps of peaſantry (infantry) ſhould be formed, of whom certainly, upon an average, four hundred could be found, who, under proper officers, might be entruſted with arms, in every county*. They might be formed in corps of fifty, each commanded by three officers, to wear their own clothing. They ſhould have a muſket without a bayonet‡; a pouch like the new magazines, to hold cartridges and balls, a powder-horn, and a ſword two inches and a half broad, ſtraight and pointed, and two feet in length, handle included, in a wooden ſcabbard. This weapon is ſomewhat ſimilar to that of the Roman Legionaries, and is uſeful in the attack of a poſt, intrenchment, &c. They ſhould not quit their county, and ought to be commanded by perſons to whom they are attached by intereſt. When on duty they ſhould receive a ſhilling a

* A perſon who conſiders every grey-coated man as a Defender, will ſhudder at the idea of arming any of the Iriſh peaſantry. Let ſuch weigh well this calculation:—There muſt be at leaſt 23 Grand Jurors in every county in Ireland; what deſcription of people muſt theſe be, if twenty of that number are not of ſufficient conſequence and influence in their county, to produce among their friends, tenants and dependents, with their adherents, twenty men each, to whom they would entruſt arms for mutual defence? If this calculation is juſt, the number required is completed. Theſe corps ſhould aſſemble for practice on Sunday and holiday evenings; it would be an amuſement, and tend to prevent idleneſs and debauchery. Where there is a police, the conſtables ſhould be inrolled in them, and might act as ſubordinate officers.

‡ They ſhould have no bayonet, to prevent as far as poſſible, their being put into the line, which they never ought to be; nor ought they ever to come within range of the muſketry of regular troops. The beſt rule to lay down for ſuch corps, is, that they ſhould never fire upon their enemy, except from under cover; as, for inſtance, from a tree, ditch, houſe, &c. In the houſe a bayonet is a uſeleſs weapon, compared to the ſword above deſcribed.

day

day and their rations. They ſhould be practiſed at firing at a mark *, covering and concealing themſelves, always acting two together, the one not firing till the other is loaded; but they ſhould never be troubled with any manœuvre, either of tactic or parade, which always deſtroys the energy of the human faculties, and ſo far deſtroys the effect which ought to be derived from light troops †.

It will be right to conſider, in caſe of an invaſion, what will be the probable turn of mind of the people. Some of the peaſantry would remain quiet ſpectators of the events of the war; ſome would join that party who ſeemed to bid faireſt for ſucceſs; others will join whoever invites them, by an offer of plunder. Some governments are afraid to put arms in the hands of the peaſantry, for fear they ſhould turn them againſt thoſe by whom they were intruſted with them. It is a vain precaution, becauſe, if they are determined upon it, they will find the means of getting them from the ſcene of war. According to the diſpoſition they ſeemed to be in; if they ſhewed a good will to the cauſe, they might be attached to the army, form a chain of out-poſts, get intelligence, &c. If they ſhewed

* Was this ſyſtem of free corps of peaſantry adopted, they might be invited to join the ſtandard, or ordered back. If they were armed with pieces of a larger bore and greater length, to reſt in order to take aim, the weight, as they have nothing elſe to carry, would not be of conſequence, and they would throw a ball double the diſtance of the ordinary muſkets.

† Ever ſince regular diſcipline has been introduced among the Imperial Croats, they have not been found ſo uſeful as they formerly were, in their capacity of flanking corps.

alſo

Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.

*Fig. 1. Represents an Armed Peasant, to shew the manner he is Accoutred, his Magazine holding his Cartridges, the horn priming powder, Fig. 2 is the Sword, two Feet long, 2 Inches 1/2 broad.*

a wavering diſpoſition, they might be put at a conſiderable diſtance in the rere. They might alſo be employed to drive the cattle up the country, tho' this would be a precarious experiment. But then the queſtion to be aſked is, Can the ſoldiers be ſpared for that ſervice at ſuch a time?

In the year 1778, an invaſion of England by the French was talked of. The inſtructions given by government were, that the army ſhould drive the cattle up the country, and the farmers and peaſantry march down to meet the enemy on the coaſt. It is to be ſuppoſed they meant to arm them. Probably they did not chooſe to truſt them to drive their own cattle, as ſuppoſing, if a farmer could get a better price for his ſheep from the French, than he could from his own countrymen, he would prefer the former. Some of the depots they had fixed on, were not five miles from the coaſt; they ought always to be farther than a poſſible day's march; the cavalry patrolled from village to village, often out of ſight even of the coaſt, in the idea of conveying intelligence of the appearance of the enemy. Fixed ſtations of infantry, with ſignal ſtaffs on the heights, are preferable. If either yeomanry, cavalry, or corps of peaſantry, ſhould be ordered from home, their families ſhould not be ſuffered to go with them, but receive a maintenance from the magazines; they would be in fact a kind of hoſtage for their fidelity.

It would be neceſſary to form corps of burghers, in the cities and conſiderable towns, under the municipal officers; they would not require clothing. In the time of danger, with proper encouragement, every houſekeeper would aſſociate

aſſociate with his neighbours, for the mutual ſecurity of their properties*.

It would perhaps be alleged, it is dangerous to do all this; theſe people are not to be entruſted with arms, becauſe they might uſe them againſt government. But ſurely, the times are replete with danger; there is danger in every ſtep we can take; and all prudence can do, is, to weigh theſe dangers well, and adopt the leſſer. If you do not put (it might be ſaid to government) confidence in the people, they will not put confidence in you. In the time of alarm they will aſſociate with thoſe, who can afford protection from the mob of the country. That protection

* Theſe are univerſally formed on the continent; they frequently are not clothed; a man may do his duty as well in a brown coat as a red one; all parade is mere childiſhneſs, anſwering merely *ad captandum vulgus*. The moſt important poſts in Paris are entruſted to the citizens. One would think that would convince thoſe who can be convinced by any thing, of the real ſtate of the nation with whom we are at war. As to the armed peaſantry, if they are commanded by officers who underſtand that ſervice, and of courſe to teach them (which they would ſoon learn) how to act, they would be as uſeful in the field, in ſuch a country as this, as the beſt regulars in Europe. The peaſantry in Brittany, of whom the Chouans (ſo called from their war cry) are a part, much reſemble ours in the more remote parts, and we ſee what they were capable of doing; but they were commanded by able officers. In a report to the Convention from that country, it was juſtly ſaid, "The children of 12 years old carry arms againſt us, and thoſe under that age act as ſpies." It is added, *ainſi en atón tuè en grand nombre*, "blood will have blood." It is aſtoniſhing that people, whoſe minds have been humaniſed by education, ſhould ever adopt the ſanguinary plan, a plan which all hiſtory tells us, has conſtantly reverted on its inventors, in which the hand of Providence is marked.

"*This even-handed juſtice, commends the ingredients of our poiſoned chalice to our own lips.*"

MACBETH.

the

the enemy will offer them; they will offer them arms if they were wanted, which they are not, for the country is full of arms. It is better, at all events, to aſſume the appearance of confidence while it can be done, for ſooner or later the people muſt ultimately be recurred to.

Let us now ſuppoſe, what will be the probable conſequence of a peace; trade will open between this country and France; the wants of the two nations are mutual; we want many things they have, and they want all the articles our country produces. Our ports would be filled with their ſhipping, and our country overrun with their people. Can it be ſuppoſed they will not import their principles? It will be anſwered—but they muſt be kept down. It is juſt as poſſible to ſtop the progreſs of time, as to ſtop the progreſs of thought; now that the people every where are beginning to diſcover their own ſtrength, it muſt be admitted, that the few cannot govern the many, except by opinion*.

If the yeomanry were eſtabliſhed, it would then indeed be eaſy to diſarm the reſt of the nation; for inſtance, impoſe a duty of two guineas annually on every perſon keeping a gun, for which he muſt have a licenſe from a magiſtrate; at the ſame time offer a certain price, to be paid for every one brought in, and impoſe a heavy penalty on any arms found in a perſon's poſſeſſion without a licenſe.

The neceſſity of a yeomanry cavalry, cannot be more urgent and viſible than at preſent; for it ſeems, the regular cavalry cannot take the

* This has been called the Age of Reaſon, but it ought more properly to be, of Reaſon*ing*—of Diſcuſſion and Inveſtigation.

field

field for want of forage. Every ſoldier's horſe is a burthen on the country; he conſumes the produce, and contributes nothing towards raiſing it. On the contrary, horſes employed in agricultural buſineſs are not ſo, becauſe they contribute their labour toward raiſing the produce of the ſoil. Now, though the horſes of the yeomanry would not abſolutely be of that deſcription, yet, as all that number is now actually exiſting, and not one the more would be kept on account of the formation of theſe corps, they would not be as the horſes of regulars, an additional burthen on the country, nor tend to increaſe the price of proviſions; nor would it be neceſſary to lay in forage for them, unleſs in the caſe of actualinvaſion.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Syſtem of Defence by Cordons.*

THE King of Pruſſia defends the Margraviate of Brandenburgh, on the ſide of Saxony, by a camp at Wittemberg; on the ſide of Hanover, by the poſt of Werben; which, as he obſerves, ſecures it.

Foland recommends, for the defence of a river, when it is part of a cordon, ſmall corps of two thouſand men every five miles. This, with the reſerves, would conſtitute a body of thirty thouſand men, to defend fifty miles of front. His account of the battle of Caſſano, and paſſage of the Adda, is very inſtructive.

Lloyd ſays, the more extenſive a frontier the eaſier defended, becauſe thoſe who attack can act on one line only, whereas thoſe who defend can act on ſeveral. There is ſcarce a ſpot from which thoſe who defend may not draw ſupplies, whereas thoſe who attack can draw them but from one. An aſſailing army ſhould endeavour to come to a deciſive action; a defending army ſhould avoid one, or endeavour to render it indeciſive.

The line of operations, is a line drawn from the point where your magazines, or ſubſiſtence, is collected. That which conſtitutes the ultimate object of your campaign, be your intention offenſive or defenſive, an invading army muſt chooſe the ſhorteſt time of operations; that of the defending army muſt be governed by the line adopted by the attacker.

If

If the defending army occupies a pafs in front of the attacker, the latter muft fend a corps in the rere of it. If this corps is not beaten, the defending army muft retire. The beft way of deftroying an invading army, is by acting on his flanks.

Before the fyftem of defence is proceeded on, it is neceffary to examine the poffible routes for an enemy to take, to ftrike at the Capital, which we fuppofe the object of his attack.

They are as follows:

*Landing in Lough-Foyle,*

1. Strabane
2. Omagh
3. Augher
4. Monaghan
5. Cootehill
6. Kingscourt
7. Navan
8. Dublin

} 8 days march

Secondly, by 1. Enniſkillen
2. Cavan
3. Athboy

} 9 days march

Thirdly, by Dungannon
Armagh
Dundalk

} 8 days march

From Sligo, by Carrick
Mullingar

} 7 days march

From the Shannon, by
Limerick
Birr, or
Maryboro'

} 9 days march

From Cork and the S. weft, by
Clonmell and Kilkenny or Caſhell and Durrow

} 10 days march.

From

From Galway, by
Roſcommon
Laneſboro'
Croſs the Shannnon
Mullingar, or by
Athenry
Athlone
Croſs the Shannon
Kilbeggan, or by
Loughrea
Banagher or Portumna
Croſs the Shannon
Portarlington
} 6 days march.

From this ſtatement it appears, that the line from Galway to Dublin, being the ſhorteſt line of operation is that which it is moſt probable an enemy will adopt.

We may ſuppoſe a probable attack to be made by the enemy, thus: That he has eſtabliſhed himſelf at Galway, and advances on his line of operation toward Dublin. He advances to the Shannon, leaves an intermediate poſt at Kilconnel, and menaces Athlone, Banagher and Portumna, or Clonfert. This compels you to divide your force. He attacks one paſs, penetrates and advances.

We ſuppoſe a plan of defence by cordons. The firſt cordon embracing the Capital, thus:

1. The Boyne to Trim,
2. Edenderry,
3. Rathangan,
4. Kilcullen,
5. Liffey,

From that to
Bleſſington,
Bray River,
Sea.

This gives a cordon of ſixty miles; the extremity of each flank being thirty miles diſtant from the centre; ſuppoſing it defended by one army, poſted at or near Edenderry; the ſea on each flank.

Second Cordon:

1. Gore's Bridge,
2. Kilkenny,
3. Roſcrea,
4. Banagher,
5. Athlone,
6. Colehill,
7. Finae,
8. Kingſcourt.

Three corps would be neceſſary on this, *pour ſe donner mutue element les mains.*

Third Cordon:

1. Cork,
2. Charleville,
3. Limerick,
4. Shannon to
5. Carrick,
6. Enniſkillen,
7. Dungannon,
8. Newry.

This is a line of twelve days march, conſtituting the exterior cordon, of which the Shannon is a principal part of the frontier. This ſhould be occupied by camps or cantonments, and is the grand line of operation, and that whereon the troops ſhould remain until the enemy develo-

lopes

lopes his plans. This line would require the following force, thus diſtributed, viz.

| | |
|---|---|
| At Cork - - | 4,000 men |
| Charleville - | 1,000 |
| Limerick - | 3,000 |
| Athlone - - | 6,000 |
| Enniſkillen - | 1,000 |
| Dungannon - | 2,000 |
| Newry - - | 1,000 |
| With a ſtrong advanced camp at Galway - | 5,000 |
| Killaloe - | 2,000 |
| Portumna - | 2,000 |
| Laneſboro' - | 2,000 |
| Carrick - | 1,000 |
| | 30,000 Total. |

The reaſons why it is probable an enemy would prefer Galway to any other of the poſſible routes, are, that thoſe by the north, as well as by the ſouth-weſt of the kingdom, are leſs capable of ſupplying his army; beſides, that the face of the country preſents much more difficulty to him, and would oblige him to proceed with more ſlowneſs and caution, than the route from Galway would require, which would be diſadvantageous to him, in addition to the line of operations being conſiderably longer. From Galway the country is more open. If he croſſes at Laneſboro', he has afterwards the Inny to croſs, which affords a poſition. Banagher is on a ſaliant bow of the river, and therefore capable of defence.

Lloyd ſays, If a river runs along your frontier, endeavour to occupy two or three capital points

on it, with good and extenſive fortreſſes, ſo that you may not only cover your own country, but alſo make it impoſſible for an enemy to penetrate, without giving you an opportunity of entering his, and cutting off his ſubſiſtence.

Of a river on a frontier he alſo ſays, tho' it be not navigable, it may be of great uſe in military operations, if it runs parallel to the frontier and croſſes the principal roads, becauſe it then furniſhes good poſitions on its banks. An army cannot prevent the enemy throwing a bridge under the protection of his artillery, but it may prevent him from occupying ſuch an extent of ground, as is neceſſary for him to deploy, and may attack it in any part without being expoſed to his artillery.

An invading army requires the direct roads to be in good order, and the croſs roads broken. A defending army, on the contrary, ſhould cauſe the direct roads to be broken, and the croſs roads made good.

The centre of the cordons of defence, is one and the ſame with the point of the enemy's line of operation, that is of courſe Dublin; the grand or exterior cordon being fully occupied with its due proportion of troops, and an advanced army ſtationed at Galway, which, for the reaſons before and hereafter to be ſpecified, is moſt likely to be the point of debarkation. Having fortreſſes fully garriſoned on the Shannon, and a ſtrong garriſon in the capital, with a camp of reſerve between it and the grand cordon, and able to act upon either, the iſland may then, ſo far as the exterior enemy is in queſtion, be conſidered as able to make a ſtand; for it would be preſumptuous indeed to ſay, it was in a complete ſtate of defence. The troops ſuppoſed to be

be deſtined for the cordon, garriſons, &c. muſt be infantry and artillery, with ſmall detachments of light cavalry to each corps or army; and hoſts of the ſame along the coaſt, for which ſervice 3,000 light cavalry would be ſufficient; the remainder of the cavalry cantoned through the counties, to maintain internal peace, which, reckoning three hundred in each county, a low computation, would take 10,000 more; the garriſon for the capital to be five thouſand, and the army of reſerve ten thouſand. The number of troops, therefore, requiſite to put this country in a ſtate of ſafety, would thus amount to ſomething leſs than ſixty thouſand men, actually fit for the field.

If the queſtion is aſked, Why diſperſe your army in a cordon?—keep them in great bodies, able to march to any point at a minute's notice. To this it is to be obſerved, that it is only poſſible to gueſs where the deſcent may be made. They may threaten * five points at the ſame time, and it ſhall be impoſſible, to the ſtations on the coaſt, to tell which is the real attack, until they have abſolutely landed. Suppoſe five expreſſes to government, from different quarters of the iſland, announce an enemy on

* The French bring great numbers into action. Where a nation has ſuch immenſe force of men, it is generally miſapplied; they throw their numbers into ſuch vaſt bodies, as to become unmanageable. The true way of employing them to advantage has been diſcovered by the French, of dividing and attacking upon many points at once. This forces their enemy to divide; he is of courſe inferior every where, and beaten in detail. It is never the intereſt of the ſmaller force to divide, if it can keep together. An army of forty thouſand men may beat an army of eighty thouſand, becauſe that number cannot be brought into action. But divide them into four parts; the four armies of twenty thouſand will invariably beat thoſe compoſed of ten.

the

the coaſt. Three of theſe perhaps are ſquadrons of frigates; one an army of amuſement, making a feint; the other the grand army. If the army for defence of the kingdom is in two camps, it is impoſſible that the army of the ſouth could quit its ſtation to act in the north, and *vice verſa*. But even if it could be imprudent enough to do ſo on the firſt report, what would be the conſequence? The falſe attacks meeting no reſiſtance, would become real ones. But where are the magazines to maintain together a great force in one point? How will they be ſupplied on the march? Either you quit your magazines to meet the enemy on the coaſt, or you remain in your central poſition, (not being able to quit them) for the enemy are to come to you; in that caſe you are obliged to act on a cordon. Immediately on ſuch intelligence as above coming to the ſeat of government, what would be the orders?—not to march, but—report; a ſecond report muſt be made, and how ſoon? by the time the enemy have actually debarked, and when they are formed on your coaſt. Then indeed comes the word, march! but in what form? you meet the enemy on the coaſt if he chooſes to wait there; if he does not, *where* do you meet him? If it is not too preſumptuous it might be ſaid, it *muſt* be on ſome part of the cordon, as above laid down. You come to an action; if you beat him, you purſue him. But ſuppoſe it turns out otherwiſe, that he comes on you with ſuperior force, or beats you, you *muſt* retreat to the ſecond cordon, to the third cordon; concentrate your force there, if you can; if not, fall back on the capital.

But

But if your armies are in two great corps, your magazines muſt be with them. If you march down then to the coaſt, your line of operation becomes longer than your enemy's. Yet the whole of your magazines muſt follow, or you may be cut off from them. If you cannot keep the field, but muſt come to an immediate action for want of them, you do exactly what the enemy wiſhes. Your centre magazines would be much better ſupplied, by ſubſtituting ſmaller ones in different ſtations.

It will be proved from experience, that the ſyſtem of cordons has always been adopted, and when it has failed the fault was not there. The reaſons why the ſyſtem of cordons is the beſt, are: Firſt, your troops are eaſier maintained: Secondly, they are eaſier drawn together: Thirdly, their poſitions muſt be better choſen: And Fourthly, that if the enemy, after being oppoſed in force on the cordon, ſucceeds and penetrates, he does not get at your magazines, but you cut off his; for when he advances, the troops left on the cordon act upon the flanks of his line of operations, cut off his ſupplies, and haraſs his rere. If he defeats your army, your grand magazines fall into his hands; but if they are detached upon the cordon, he cannot turn out of his line to ſeize them.

That they are eaſier maintained, being diſperſed at twenty or fifteen miles diſtance, than if they were aſſembled in a grand army at any one point, is pretty obvious. The reaſon why they are eaſier drawn together is this: their magazines are not confined to a point. Thus, for example, an enemy is in the weſt; orders come for the troops on the grand cordon to rendezvous at Athlone;

Athlone; the orders are iſſued, and the poſt is occupied as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Firſt day, garriſon conſiſts of - - | | | 6,000 Men. |
| That day there arrives from Portumna - | | | 2,000 |
| | | Laneſboro' - | 2,000 |
| | | At Galway - | 5,000 |
| There are thus brought together in one day | | | 15,000 |
| The ſecond day | from Killaloe | 2,000 | 3,000 |
| | Carrick | 1,000 | |
| The third day from Dublin the army of reſerve - - | | 10,000 | 14,000 |
| | Enniſkillen - | 1,000 | |
| | Limerick - | 3,000 | |
| | | | 32,000 |

Thus, 32,000 men are brought together in three days. There is no difficulty for forage, &c. as they find it at the ſeveral poſts on their march upon the cordon. The ſame in regard to carriages; the roads, it is ſuppoſed, they muſt have in proper order, and be well acquainted with. The army of reſerve ſhould be able to march, for inſtance, on at leaſt two columns; the troops from the cordon, being fewer in number, might march on one. It would not be neceſſary for the magazines to follow, for this reaſon, that if there is at Athlone proviſions for ſix thouſand men (as there ought) for two months, there are proviſions for thirty thouſand for ten days; and during the interval of the enemy's being on the coaſt, they ſhould forage with large parties in the front of their cordon, and if poſſible reduce it to a deſart. But if the army waits the advance of the enemy, whatever redundant forage is collected, ſhould be ſent back at leaſt behind the ſecond cordon, and not more than fourteen days proviſions

proviſions left with the grand army at one time.

The troops on the extremity of the frontier, would at the ſame time cloſe inwards. A detachment from Cork would occupy Limerick in three days, and from Dungannon to Carrick in the ſame period. If the grand army is beaten, thoſe flank corps act upon the flanks of the enemy as he advances; and the defending army occupies the poſition previouſly aſcertained on the ſecond cordon, where its magazines are ready formed. It muſt be obſerved, that there are forced marches, but certainly not an unreaſonable calculation, for an army freed from baggage, and the longeſt march not exceeding three days.

The poſitions upon theſe cordons, forage, and roads, ſhould be previouſly examined, and the ſtate of forage both in front and rere reported. Where the roads are not good they ſhould be repaired, and where wanting opened.

The advantage alſo of a cordon is, that by retreating you concentrate your force; thus, if not ſtrong enough to oppoſe on the firſt cordon, call back all your troops to the ſecond. This will be further elucidated, by conſidering Dalton's cordon, between the Elbe and Iſer.

If the alarm is a falſe one, the troops are eaſily countermanded. If the enemy lands on a flank, it of courſe takes double the time to bring the ſame number together; therefore, the reſerves ſhould be ſtationed a portèe of the weakeſt part, and the flanks ſtrengthened as much as poſſible; at all events, poſitions ſhould be choſen in the rere

N. B. Soldiers ſhould learn to uſe ſhoes like the Croats, of undreſſed leather; by which an infinite trouble in campaigns would be ſaved.

to

to assemble on. Wherever an action is to be risqued, the defending army have it in their power to appoint the field, which is in front of their position. This they can turn to their advantage thus: if they are superior in cavalry, open the ground for 800 yards front of the flanks, and occupy it by the cavalry. If your army manœuvres, give yourself room. If it is composed of troops that you cannot rely on in face of an enemy, occupy hedges and ditches, taking care to cut intervals in them, but always so that they are flanked with musquetry. Break up all the passes, roads, &c. in front of your grand cordon, except what it is for your own convenience to keep.

Always forage in front. Keep not more than fourteen days provisions in the magazines on your grand cordon; form them also on your second, and send back all your redundancy there. The enemy will thus find nothing on landing. The advanced corps on the coast should never have more there than one week's provisions in the magazines. Dalton occupied his famous position between the Iser and the Elbe, with 26 battalions and 14 squadrons, forming an arc of upwards of a hundred miles, the mountains in his front, the curve toward the enemy.

They were cantoned as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reichenber, | 2 Battlions. | Leitnerity & Teschen | 2 |
| Lagebruch | 2 | Seeferstdorf | 2 |
| Bomish Ancher | 4 | Penkraty | 2 |
| Liebenau | 2 | Remburg | 1 |
| Reichstadt & Leipee | 2 | Georgethal | 1 |
| Memes & Gabel | 2 | | |

The cavalry distributed by Greisdorf, Einsiedal, Ober and Nieder Grand, were cantoned in the open

open country, and in the centre of his line; his infantry in the mountainous parts. Had he been attacked, his intention was to take a poſition between Reichenberg and the Jeſchkowberg. As he fell back, he would have at the ſame time concentrated his forces. The King of Pruſſia ſaid, his poſition was ſtronger than the citadel of Liſle. By the excellence of this cordon, the hereditary dominions are covered by thirty thouſand men effectually; but theſe points are all ſtudied by the Auſtrian and Pruſſian officers, in time of peace, and when they go into the field, they are perfectly acquainted with the ſtrong and weak part of every poſition.

M. Catinat was obliged, in 1692, to defend a greater frontier with about the ſame force, but failed for want of magazines and carriages. An army cannot be expected to act, if deprived thus of locomotive powers. His line of defence extended from the Lake of Geneva to the Mediterranean.

Two examples of paſſage of a river are ſelected, becauſe they furniſh an idea of the ſyſtem of frontier war. The Prince of Conti, obliged to paſs the Rhine, retired to his two bridges, a league below Worms, where the Rhine forms an elbow. He encamped at Nordheim, the brook Hoffheim to his right, the river Wirchnitz to his left, a part of his army thrown back along the river to the village of Vattenheim; he threw up detached redoubts, which ſupported each other mutually along his whole front, between the two rivers, and ſome near the village of Bolſtat, a quarter of a league in his front; five redoubts were made round the heads of the bridges, and the enemy could not paſs without firſt taking them. The baggage paſſed during the

the night. At day-break a corps of cavalry ſhewed itſelf, formed at Bolſtat, and the army croſſed the Rhine. When the troops formed before Bolſtat, who maſked the retreat, began alſo to retire, they were haraſſed by ſome irregulars, but being ſupported, retired in order to the redoubts, covering the bridges; *theſe* checked the enemy, and they were purſued and driven back to Bolſtat Here the ſuperiority of redoubts over lines proved itſelf. The enemy could not have been purſued from the latter, without the army's defiling, by which a precious time would have been loſt.

Montecuculi wiſhed to penetrate into Alſace by Straſburgh, where alſo his magazines and bridges were. Turenne taking a poſition near that city, compelled it to a neutrality, and of courſe entrance was refuſed to Montecuculi, but it was the latter's object to remove Turenne from his poſition commanding Straſburgh; he therefore made a feint as if he meant to beſiege Philipſburgh. It was alſo Turenne's object to cut off Montecuculi's communication with Straſburgh, and thereby from his magazines and bridge. When therefore the latter moved toward Philipſburgh, Turenne threw a reinforcement into that place, and then croſſed the Rhine, and occupied the ſtrong camp of Vilſtett, by which he carried the following great points: he cut off Montecuculi's communication with his magazines, carried the war out of his own country, prevented any poſſibility of the enemy's penetrating there, and ultimately obliged his adverſary to fall back, and loſe the whole campaign, as effectually as he could have done it by the moſt ſignal defeat.

This

This is a moſt inſtructive leſſon, where the war is carried on upon great rivers which are not eaſily fordable; when that happens the buſineſs aſſumes a new face; and it is neceſſary to watch every where, the grand army retaining a central poſition, a partiè, to ſuccour the whole. The ſcene of Montecuculi's manœuvres was about ſixty miles in extent.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

ANOTHER ſyſtem of defence may be, by concentrating the great force of the kingdom at Athlone, and forming the military depot for the whole there, leaving garriſons of not leſs than 5,000 men in the capital, and in the north and weſt parts of the kingdom. In this caſe it would be neceſſary to have a large force in the county of Cork, as it would otherwiſe take ſix days march for an army, in caſe of an enemy landing there. Limerick alſo muſt be ſtrongly occupied; but if Galway were threatened at the ſame time, the Athlone army would be held in check; while an army landing in the ſouth-weſt could march direct by Clonmell and the Barrow, croſſing that river and leaving it on its left for Dublin; the whole of which route the country is abundantly provided with all things neceſſary for its ſupport. In that caſe, if the Cork army acts on the flank of the enemy, the Athlone army muſt fall back on Dublin. This gives an enemy, if in any force on the coaſt of Galway, an opportunity of landing and penetrating to the Shannon; then the two enemy's armies might effect a junction, as to a moral certainty; all the out corps muſt be called in, to form and defend the Capital.

If the grand army is attacked with a great force on the Leinſter ſide of the Shannon, and at the ſame time with another force from Galway,

Galway, its retreat is cut off; it can occupy no poſition, and muſt if defeated be deſtroyed, and the iſland conquered; therefore, it cannot in that caſe ſtay there, it muſt fall back to the third cordon; then all its magazines at Athlone are loſt.

If a central army marches to the ſouth point of the kingdom, it cannot protect the Shannon, and if the Shannon is ever gained by an enemy's army of 40,000 men, all the forces of the empire will not diſlodge it; nor could the army from the ſouth fall back in time to protect the Capital. At any rate the magazines ought not to be formed at Athlone, but conſiderably in the rere. It is alſo certain, that take what poſition on the Shannon you will, if a hoſtile detachment lands either in the north or weſt, it is on your rere; you muſt either beat it or retire. Nor can a cordon be formed according to this plan; the communication with the capital muſt be maintained by an intermediate poſt. Let the great poſition be where it will, Dublin muſt be maintained, in order to preſerve the communication with England. This intermediate force muſt be ſtrong, or it is nothing; if you make it ſtrong, you ſo far diminiſh the force you oppoſe to the enemy.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IX.

*On Camps—Poſitions—and Inundations.*

THE King of Pruſſia ſays, get good provincial charts and ſtudy them, impreſſing on the mind the names and ſituations of cities, rivers, and chains of mountains. Having acquired a general idea of the country, proceed to particulars; examine the direction of the roads, where an attack would be likely to be attended with moſt eaſe and ſucceſs, and what force would be required; how far rivers are navigable, and where fordable; diſcover if they are dry in ſummer, or impaſſable in winter; obſerve the ſtate of the lands, and what the general produce is; by what route an army can march from one city or river to another, and mark the beſt poſitions on theſe routes. Of plain and open countries we eaſily acquire an idea, of mountainous and woody with more difficulty, yet they muſt be known; ride into them with your map in your hand; take peaſants, hunters, &c. with you; aſcend the higheſt grounds, compare their anſwers with your map. Obſerve how many columns could march, or if it is poſſible to turn the enemy's rere or flank. Mark where a defenſive camp could be taken, but particularly obſerve the gorges, or debouchures. Revolve in your mind all the poſſible contingencies that can take place in thoſe ſituations, ſo that if they become

come the ſeat of war, you may carry a clear impreſſion of the whole in your mind. This muſt be done while you have leiſure, and are unobſtructed.

The following circumſtances are required and abſolutely neceſſary to a camp, viz. wood and water. The front ſhould be covered, and the rere open.

The coup d'œil conſiſts in the following faculties: the firſt is, to judge how many troops will occupy a certain poſition, from examining it with the eye. The ſecond, which is a much more arduous talent, conſiſts in being able to ſeize at once (mentally) and decide upon every advantage the locality can give. [This talent practice can acquire and perfect.] An able general turns the ſmalleſt height, a hollow road, a ditch, to his advantage.

The ſquare of ſix miles will afford two hundred poſitions, and no two alike. A general's eye at the firſt glance decides which of all of them is the beſt.

Nothing is ſo difficult, (ſays the King) as to defend the paſſage of a river for a conſiderable length. I would never undertake it if it exceeded fifty miles, or was fordable. He remarks, that if you have a river in front, your field of battle muſt be within half muſquet ſhot of your poſition.

The King of Pruſſia, by taking poſt at Wittemberg, covers a part of an hundred and fifty miles of country. With his two armies he covers upward of two hundred. The camp of Perna is an example of an impregnable poſt, ſeventeen thouſand men defended a front of ſeven miles.

The King of Pruſſia ſays, in chooſing a poſition for a camp, to cover a country, it is not merely the ſtrength of that poſition which is to be conſidered, but its relative ſituation; that is to ſay, that it muſt not only be ſtrong, but it muſt be ſo ſituated that notwithſtanding its ſtrength, the enemy *muſt* attack it, in order to proceed upon his plans. It cannot be expected that ſuch a poſition ſhould cover every poſſible road that the enemy could advance on; but it muſt command thoſe which are moſt material to his grand deſign. It muſt be ſuch a one, that in caſe of attack, the army which defends it muſt have no cauſe of apprehenſion, and that the enemy muſt have great doubt of his ſucceſs; and alſo ſuch a one, that the enemy cannot avoid, without ſubjecting himſelf to the greateſt riſque and inconveniency; that he muſt make wide circuitous marches to avoid it, while I by ſmall movements can anticipate him in all his attempts.

The poſition at Nieuſtadt covers all Lower Sileſia, on the ſide of Moravia, a frontier of a hundred miles; the river and town in front of the poſt. If the enemy attempts to paſs between Ollmachen and Glatz, a movement between Neuſs and Ziegenhals cuts his communication off with Moravia; a camp between Schomberg and Lieban, guards Sileſia on the ſide of Bohemia. An enemy cannot advance on the ſide of Cone, if I am poſted between Troppau and Yagerndorff; if he does, his convoys are cut off.

Poſitions are natural fortification. All that is requiſite is the talent to ſee and to chooſe them. From the above examples the following concluſion is to be drawn: that however neceſſary fortreſſes may be, and however expedient it is for a nation

to

to have its moſt important poſts fortified, yet that they do not conſtitute the beſt or only defence of a country; and that it is by manœuvring armies and able generals, that they are to be either conquered or defended.

It is always prudent to intrench the camp in the neighbourhood of the enemy, taking care to leave many and large debouchures, that the movements of the army may not be cramped. No difficult ground ſhould interſect a camp; if there is any ſuch, numerous paſſes ought immediately to be made over it.

An army commands as much of a poſition, as it is in reach of in an eaſy day's march, on both flanks. If the enemy is ten miles in your front, you muſt be acquainted with his movements. If he marches to your right flank, you extend yourſelf in your poſition to your right; the poſition ſhould always deſcribe an arc; the curve to the enemy. Two armies of ten thouſand men each, will occupy a country for 30 miles. If it is meant for a defenſive poſition, break up bridges and roads in the front, and throw chevaux-de-frize, &c. in the fords, to make the advance on it difficult. If it is meant to march toward the enemy, open as many roads as poſſible, that the army may be put upon as many columns as its ſtrength requires. Always detach out-lying piquets and grand guard beyond rivers. If it is near you, throw up works to defend the bridges or fords you leave paſſable, and occupy the mountains with your armed peaſantry, if you have them.

The mountains of Ireland are not like thoſe of the continent, to which the King of Pruſſia alludes, as before quoted: they bear no campaign, therefore a foreign officer, reading of the mountains in this

country, would be quite deceived if he imagined them to be rough, rocky, covered with fine foreſts, producing grain, inhabited, and with narrow defiles. Ours are wild high waſtes, boggy, and unfit for man or beaſt, but entirely open.

The bogs in Ireland are ſometimes inſulated, and more frequently in chains. They ſeem to have been originally formed by the caſual obſtruction of ſome ſmall ſtream of water, not of ſufficient force to work a channel for itſelf, and ſtagnating in this moiſt climate, where the ſun has not power to make it evaporate quickly, and where the tendency to vegetation is very great. A ſpongy ſubſtance forms itſelf, increaſes of courſe the ſtagnation, retains the moiſture, and grows from year to year. Probably if the country were not inhabited, and the exertion of human induſtry oppoſed to this proceſs of nature, in a few centuries all Ireland would be one vaſt bog. Theſe bogs are, ſome more and ſome leſs, to a certain degree paſſable in ſummer, for men, but unable to bear a horſe or carriage. They have generally a very gradual fall, as the principle of their formation evinces, which is neceſſary to be obſerved, as their uſe in a military light in a great meaſure depends on this circumſtance. They are generally ſurrounded, immediately at their edges, by elevated ground which commands them.

The more water is obſtructed, the more impaſſable the bog behind it becomes, and where an army can have ground of this kind on its front or flank, it ſhould endeavour to render that part of their poſition impracticable, wherever a head of water could by means of dams be formed with moſt advantage. By doing it, theſe bogs ſpread to a very wide extent, and in parts con-

tract

tract very narrow. The narroweſt point thro' which the ſtream runs, ſhould be taken for making the inundation, by throwing a dam from the projecting point of the high ground, on one ſide, to that on the oppoſite. This ſhould be commanded, eſpecially the lower ſide, by a work mounted with artillery, which ſhould rake the whole of the embankment. It ſhould be covered by chevaux-de-frize, an abbatis, &c. or ſtrong palliſades; the bogs often ſupply timber of oak fit for this. If the fall is one yard in two hundred, which is a medium calculation, an embankment of this kind twenty-one feet high, will inundate the poſition for near an Engliſh mile; but it would render all the bog behind it impaſſable, by its abſorbing the water, and become too wet to bear a man, eſpecially if aſſiſted by rains.

Our rivers are generally ſmall, but with ſtrong banks, therefore, of great conſequence in military operations. No river is ſo deep or ſo wide, as to be relied on for ſecurity; it muſt ſtill be guarded. They are the moſt certain features in the face of a country; they mark the ground for military operations, and are in nature what ſcales and degrees are on a map. If an army occupies a poſition, a river is moſt advantageous on its front; if an army is in march, on its flank.

A dry ſeaſon may render a river paſſable where it never was; ſometimes fords are not known except to very few. No river is ſo large, that it ought to be conſidered impaſſable; nor none ſo ſmall, that advantage may not be drawn from it. Any mill-ſtream may be turned to the purpoſe of inundation.

The

The greateſt poſition afforded in Ireland, is the weſt bank of the Shannon; another preſents itſelf from Maguire's-bridge, to Charlemont in the north. One might alſo be taken from Portadown to Newry; alſo from Belturbet to Carrick. From Kilkenny to Nenagh affords a chain of poſitions of a great extent.

Every poſition that it is poſſible could ever be required, ſhould be previouſly examined; its advantages and diſadvantages noted down; the points to be fortified, marked; the quantity of artillery and troops it would require, entered down, that at a minute's notice it might be occupied; if it is to be fortified, the peaſantry on the arrival of the officer of engineers might be immediately ſet to work, in caſe of invaſion.

Inſtead of bat horſes, two-wheeled carriages ſhould be ordered for the conveyance of the troops' baggage; they ſhould be ſo conſtructed that they could be taken to pieces, and carried over difficult paſſes; as alſo, in caſe of a horſe ſinking, that they might be put on others.

It would be adviſeable to have flying corps, compoſed of ten companies of grenadiers or light infantry, with four field pieces, and a ſquadron of light dragoons; they would be advanced in front of the grand army; they ought to be diſincumbered of all unneceſſary baggage, and carry an additional number of rounds of ammunition. Every man ſhould have a blanket large enough to cover his head and feet, and a watch coat made as light as poſſible*.

* The ſhoes of undreſſed leather, uſed by the Croats, might be adopted to great advantage by our military, if they only uſed them on marches. The conſumption and expence of ſhoes is inconceivable. In that caſe every man could make his own. All that is requiſite is a piece of undreſſed hide, which he cuts to the ſhape of the foot; it laces from the toe to above the ankle.

Gun-

Gun-boats on the lakes, and at the entrance of the Shannon, would be of uſe.

If two armies execute flank movements, each on their reſpective poſitions, in order to pre-occupy a poſt, paſs, &c. and one has a greater length of march to perform than the other, that diſadvantage muſt be got over, either by making the road more eaſy, or ſo that a greater front may march on it; or ſecondly, by turning the attention of the enemy, by a diverſion on ſome other point, and ſo concealing your movement, unleſs there is a ſufficient force to be able to detach cavalry to haraſs his rear, or light infantry to intercept him at a defile.

Whichever army occupies the paſs firſt, the other cannot force it in his preſence, nor can the occupier, although ſo far maſter of it, attempt the paſſage in the face of his adverſary, without the greateſt precaution.

The advantages of high ground for poſitions, are, that the enemy's movements are all open to you, while yours are concealed from him. In caſe of an attack, he is expoſed to the fire of your artillery and muſquetry, while his has little effect on you. If an army has an enemy in front, and advances, it muſt open roads; but in flank marches, three roads are all required. If there is but one made road, that ſhould be reſerved for the baggage, and other roads ſhould be opened for the two columns. Theſe flank roads ſhould be marked out on the army's coming into its poſition; they ſhould be wide enough to admit a company in front.

When an army marches into a country, where it has not had time to prepare the roads, for example, in five columns, each column will have its

its guides in front, who by camp colours will mark out the route of the column, according to the directions of the quarter-maſter-general; the pioneers follow the guides, and level the road for their column; the baggage ſhould, if poſſible, march on the high road.

The army ought to have ſo many roads open in rere of its poſition, as in caſe of neceſſity to be able to retreat on ſix columns.

CHAP.

## CHAP. X.

### *Duty of Officers.*

WHEN an officer, of what rank ſoever, arrives at his poſt, he ſhould come provided with the beſt general and local maps he can procure. If it is on the coaſt, he ſhould alſo get a chart of it. Theſe he ſhould compare with the ground, examine what depth of water there is, how high the tide riſes, where ſhipping would command the ſhore, and where they would be commanded by it. He ſhould examine all the roads, paſſes, rivers, fords, mountains and poſitions, calculate their diſtances by his computation, for inſtance, by the time he takes in going from one to the other. He ſhould examine the ſtate of the country as to forage, take the number of mills, how much they uſually work, and what they they have in ſtore; inquire where corn and other articles of proviſion are kept; what fairs there are, and whence the cattle are brought. He ſhould cultivate acquaintance with the people of the country, and endeavor to find out their temper and diſpoſition, in order to be able to anſwer inquiries, and point them out to his ſuperiors. He ſhould be on horſeback conſtantly, when not on other duties; examine things with his own eyes, and not truſt to reports. If there are no maps of the country, he muſt compute the diſtances of towns, roads, rivers, &c. and from rough maps

from

from his own calculations. Where there is a poſition, he ſhould meaſure the diſtance of the neighbouring heights by paces, and ſee if it is commanded; this knowledge, previouſly acquired, will give him confidence in a time of danger. In time of harveſt he ſhould calculate, how much corn of all ſorts is in the country, and inquire whither it uſually goes.

Fuel is an eſſential article; he ſhould inquire what ſtock there is of that, if there is a ſufficiency for troops in caſe of being put in winter cantonments. All this inquiry is neceſſary, to poſſeſs an officer with that general and miſcellaneous knowledge, without which he never can be of uſe.

If he is in an advanced poſt, he muſt be cautious not to give unneceſſary alarms, to impreſs the public with an idea of extraordinary alertneſs; and not tranſmit a report, till he has examined into the foundation of it himſelf.

The following anecdote of the great Guſtavus Adolphus, tranſmitted to us by Prince Henry of Pruſſia, ſtrongly authorize the principles here laid down. His words are: " Il dit, (Schildknecht officier d'ingénieurs) que le Monarque Suedois étant au camp de Beerwalde, avoit projetté de s'emparer d'un defilé, pour ſurprendre les Impériaux dans leur camp. Mais que comme il ne ſe fioit jamais aux cartes gravées, & qu'il étoit impoſſible d'aller reconnoître le terrein parceque l'ennemi l'occupoit, cet ingenieur en fit le plan d'après le rapport des habitans, & le préſenta aux Roi qui dirigea ſa marche en conſéquence, mais l'armée avant d'arriver au défilé, ſe trouva tout d'un coup, vis-à-vis d'un marais qui n'étoit pas marqué dans le plan de l'ingénieur. Ce marais pouvoit

pouvoit être deféndu par l'ennemi, & coûter beaucoup de monde aux Suedois. Le Roi rebrouſſa chemin, & traita fort malle pauvre Schildknecht, qui aſſura ſa Majeſté que le plan avoit été fait ſur le rapport d'un vieux gentilhomme & d'un eccleſiaſtique du lieu. Eh bien, dit le Roi en plaiſantant, ſuivez ces braves gens, & faites vous montrer ce marais pour n'en pas tromper d'autres.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

*On the internal Situation of the Country.*

IF you have no great magazines, and live only from day to day, and the people of the country are ill affected to you, and cut off your daily and caſual ſupplies, what becomes of the war? If a country is in a ſtate of defence, there ſhould be a year's proviſion in advance in the military magazines. If there is not a ſufficiency wherever the army comes, they or the people of the country muſt ſtarve. The conſequence of ſtarving is deſperation and pillage. What kind of foraging parties muſt you then ſend out? There is no country where a good underſtanding between the army and country people is ſo neceſſary, as in Ireland. At any rate, your magazines ought to be formed this year for the enſuing one. Suppoſe you are obliged to take the field in March or April, ſuch a thing is impoſſible. Where is your corn, potatoes, or fuel; where forage for your cavalry before Auguſt? Theſe are ſerious conſiderations, and no one thinks of them. The generality of people imagine, all that is neceſſary for an army to take the field, is to have canvas to cover them.

The buſineſs of maintaining an army, ſo as to keep its operations unclogged, is a ſcience by itſelf. It muſt be conſidered, that in an emergency, the country will be charged cent. per cent. more

more than the value. Whatever is bought in the country might be paid in government debentures; ſmall ones might be ſtruck off for that purpoſe.

What is the loſs of ten ſail of the line and two hundred tranſports, to the French, compared to getting poſſeſſion of this country? It is to be hoped government will ſee the conſequence of it in due time. In four days from the appearance of an enemy on the coaſt, it is poſſible for them to be in poſſeſſion of all Connaught, and probably a conſiderable part of Ulſter. Imagine the ſituation of this country, with forty thouſand French on the weſt of the Shannon, and ten thouſand from Belturbet to Newry. If our forces advance toward Connaught, the French army of the north is in their rere; if againſt the north, the army from Connaught is on their left and rere.

Immediately on landing, the enemy would moſt probably publiſh a proclamation, offering indemnity and ſecurity to all who ſtaid at home, and inviting the country people to bring proviſions to his camp. This would open a communication between them, and facilitate his means of procuring intelligence. If he found the people of the country ill affected to the government, he would deliver out arms to them, and take them in pay, form pioneers, free corps, &c.

Probably no inducement could make an Engliſhman act in concert with a Frenchman; ſuch is their antipathy. There is as yet no affection between the two nations here, but there certainly is no antipathy to the French.

Any one who has ſeen the wealth and happineſs of the Dutch and Flemiſh peaſantry, and afterwards ſeen them run over to their invader, will be

be apt to inquire, if there are any peculiar circumſtances in the caſe of the Iriſh peaſantry, which will induce them to adopt a contrary conduct. If they are not more wealthy, more happy, and more independent; if they are not more attached to their laws and government; if they have not more reaſon to be ſo, is it probable that they will adopt a contrary conduct? The Flemings certainly lived under a happy government, and had no reaſon to diſlike the Houſe of Auſtria. Every well-wiſher to his country ought to conſider theſe points in time; in the moment of danger it is too late, and we muſt at laſt recur to the peaſantry for protection*.

One cannot but be ſurprized, that the importance of this country ſhould have ſtruck the world in general ſo little of late years. Previous to the independence of America, it was an obſcure ſpot at the extremity of the old world, and would probably have remained ſo, had America continued to be peopled only with ſavages. Ignorant of navigation, and conſequently incapable of coming forward in the great theatre of the human race. America has as yet much to do at home; probably it will be many years before ſhe will begin to ſhew all her greatneſs in action, before ſhe will have her due weight in the political balance of the world; but if their

* The planters in the Weſt-India iſlands are obliged to adopt the deſperate reſource of arming their negro ſlaves, and our men of property are afraid to truſt their own tenants! If this is the caſe, can any thing be more deſperate than our ſituation? The French, when their country was invaded, armed the whole people, and the people did not betray their truſt. How wretched then muſt be the ſituation of thoſe, who are afraid to recur to ſuch an expedient, and with what face will they attempt it, when it can be no longer avoided.

progreſs increaſes in the ſame proportion that it has done, and there is every reaſon to think it will do even more, they will probably cauſe a revolution in the affairs of the world, in which theſe countries will participate more deeply than any other.

Ireland, ſituated between the two continents, is, notwithſtanding the misfortunes of ſix centuries, now increaſing in wealth, in civilization, and population. Happy would it be if the two former kept pace with the laſt; but unfortunately the drain of the upper claſſes of the people and their money to England, is ſuch, as prevents the country's deriving all or near the advantages nature and the times hold out to her. It is to be hoped, that the connection between the two countries will be ever maintained; yet this war England ſeems to have either deſpiſed the power of France too much, or it relied too much on the natural ſtrength of Ireland; or finally, it was not aware of its conſequence; for it was left by her in what may in the moſt unqualified manner be called, an abſolutely defenceleſs ſtate.

Ireland contains about five millions of people of all deſcriptions, of whom the poor are at leaſt four million ſeven hundred thouſand. By poor is meant, not farmers and tradeſmen, but thoſe who are obliged to work to earn their ſuſtenance from day to day. One reaſon for this great proportion of poor, is, that every man marries. In moſt other countries people do not, unleſs they have ſome proſpect of a maintenance for their families. It were to be wiſhed that in this country, property and independence, (without a certain degree of which mankind will not be at reſt) were more diffuſed. It is true, men are never to be ſatisfied. A monarch who poſſeſſes dominions

dominions larger than the reſt of Europe, finds that a ſpot of her neighbour's territory lies convenient, and ſeizes it. Here is no ſtimulus of want, but merely the love of acquiſitions, that Providence has implanted in the human mind. Can it then be wondered at, if what is commonly called the mob, that part of ſociety compoſed of all that is wretched, all that is outcaſt, and all that is hopeleſs, ſhould turn upon the property of their wealthy neighbour, when an opportunity offers. If it is ſaid, they were born and are uſed to their ſituation, that is the language of unfeeling folly. That country is wretched, indeed, where ninety-nine in every hundred ſee and feel, that no change, no revolution, can poſſibly make them worſe or more miſerable than they actually are. From ſuch a ſtate of thinking they muſt look with anxiety for a change.

Where the inhabitants of a country are diſunited among themſelves, that country cannot enjoy ſecurity. All patriotiſm is ſmothered in the effervescence of private animoſities, and the moſt deſtructive paſſions. Such, happily, is not the ſtate of England; nor will it any where elſe add to the ſtrength or ſecurity of her empire*. England for many years engroſſed the trade and wealth of the univerſe, without a rival, and founded her ſplendor on it; but it is not in the nature of things that it can be always ſo; trade will in time find its level, and all cannot be gainers.

Should England decline, in proportion to her decadence, the value of Ireland to her increaſes; the attachment of Ireland ſhould alſo increaſe, united by ſituation, language, manners, and common intereſt. Such a band ought to be indiſſoluble.

* Witneſs the late events in the Weſt-Indies.

The beſt way to perpetuate it is, by endeavouring to convince both nations, that is to ſay, not the few but the great maſs of both nations that *they* are benefited by the connection; and let not the multitude be deſpiſed by the rich and great. It is that the rich may enjoy eaſe, that the poor man labours; and for their ſecurity that the poor fight and bleed. In the hour of danger and diſtreſs, the great, the powerful, and the wealthy, muſt throw themſelves for protection on their poor neighbours, for their lives, their families, and their properties. It is therefore the particular intereſt, not of the poor, but of the rich, to endeavour to make the cauſe of the nation a common one. If it is alledged, that the lower orders will not believe the arguments adduced in ſuch a queſtion, ſtill the principle is undeniable, and it is an additional reaſon againſt procraſtinating the only ſecurity of the rich until the hour of danger—it is then too late.

And it will be well for thoſe who have power to remember, that if the poorer claſſes are the people, it is for the happineſs of the people that power has been delegated to them; that a national cauſe is not the cauſe of the few, but of the many.

La Jaquerie was the name given to a moſt dreadful civil war, with which France was once ſcourged. It was an inſurrection of the peaſantry, owing to the oppreſſion of the nobles.

The Hungarian peaſantry in their laſt inſurrection, to which they were goaded by every ſpecies of oppreſſion, committed dreadful exceſſes, ſhutting up the nobility in their caſtles, and

ſetting fire to them, &c. Horiah and Kloſkar were delegated by the peaſants to preſent their petition to the Emperor. Horiah was a man of great talents. It is reported the anſwer of the Emperor was in the following words: "It is all your own fault."

Poland has neither ſtrong ground, nor rivers, nor fortreſſes; its people are diſpirited by their ſtate of vaſſalage; they are treated every where with indignity. A poſtilion exerciſes his whip on every unfortunate peaſant with impunity, who is not able to get out of his way in time. They are abject, unprincipled, drunken and licentious. Having no ſecurity for property, they have no buſineſs to acquire more than ſuſtains them from day to day; and their nobility are under no tie to treat them well. Yet when the country was invaded, the defenders of it were headed by tradeſmen (ſhoemakers) of Warſaw, and the nobility did not then diſdain their ſtation or their aſſiſtance.

There is ſomething ſo extraordinary in the following, that the tranſlation of it, from the original German, may not be unacceptable:

"War muſt be carried on, either in our own, or in a neutral, or in an enemy's country. If I had no view but to my own glory, I would always prefer making my own dominions the ſeat of war. As there, every man ſerves for a ſpy, and the enemy cannot ſtir a ſtep without its being known, I can then ſend out large or ſmall parties without apprehenſion, and make any movement I pleaſe without riſque. If the enemy is beaten, every peaſant becomes a ſoldier and haraſſes

raſſes the enemy. Of that the Elector Frederick William had experience, after the battle of Fehrbellin, where the peaſants killed more of the Swediſh ſoldiers, than there were ſlain in the action; and the ſame circumſtance happened to me after the battle of Hohenfriedberg, where the mountaineers of Sileſia brought me in a multitude of Auſtrian priſoners. Where the country, which is the ſeat of war, is neutral, that party always has the advantage, which is able to obtain the good will of the people. In ſuch a ſituation the ſtricteſt diſcipline muſt be obſerved, and plunder and marauding ſeverely puniſhed.

" The enemy muſt be charged with the worſt deſigns againſt the country. If it is Proteſtant, profeſs yourſelves on all occaſions the defenders of the Proteſtant religion, and trumpet forth in the hearing of the lower orders of the people, whoſe ſimplicity is eaſily impoſed on, the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of religious fanaticiſm. If on the other hand, the country is Catholick, your converſation muſt run on the propriety of univerſal toleration in matters of religion; profeſs the moſt moderate ſentiments, and lament that prieſtcraft ſhould have cauſed ſuch difference between mankind, who are all agreed in the main principles of Chriſtianity.

" In regard to detachments, &c. all that muſt be entirely regulated by the knowledge you acquire of the good or ill diſpoſition of the country people toward you. From the untolerated religious ſectaries, aſſiſtance may be derived; the gentry, let them pretend what they will, will betray you, ſo will the clergy. But the great ground on which to put yourſelf, is religious fanaticiſm. If

I can once ſucceed in exaſperating a people, on the ſcore of liberty of conſcience, and can perſuade them that they are oppreſſed by their clergy and gentry, you may rely on them. I call this bringing heaven and hell on my ſide. Taxes afford a good ground for agitating the people's minds; perſuade them that in caſe of a change of government they would be taken off," &c. &c.

It is neceſſary to obſerve, that the foregoing inſtructions are not written by a Democrat; but that though they contain traits of the moſt ſublime Jacobiniſm, they are a part of the ninth articles of ſecret inſtructions of the great Frederick of Pruſſia to his officers; of Frederick the King, Hero, Legiſlator and Philoſopher; the goodneſs of whoſe heart, unchanged by greatneſs and proſperity, was equally conſpicuous in his perſonal friendſhips, and his regard for the happineſs and proſperity of his dominions. And it alſo appears hereby, that the French have not the merit of having diſcovered this new ſyſtem of ſetting the world in a flame, and ſhaking eſtabliſhed governments, as has been attributed to them, and which they arrogated to themſelves.

When ſuch meaſures are adopted by a character, to whom they are ſo uncongenial, as that above-mentioned, it only proves, that men's actions and principles are determined by the ſituations into which fortune throws them.

Every ſuggeſtion which is here laid down, as proper to inſtil into the minds of the ſubjects of a hoſtile Sovereign, is equally applicable to thoſe of

of that Monarch from whom they proceed; yet becauſe the meaſure anſwers the emergency of the moment, it is adopted without any fear of a future retribution.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

*On Frontiers in general—On Deſcents—And Paſſage of Rivers.*

THE paſſage of rivers is ſo much connected with the defence of frontiers, and there is ſuch a ſimplicity in the conduct of a deſcent, and the rules to be followed in the former caſe, that the two ſubjects of conſideration may be, perhaps, not improperly thrown together. Since countries, as Poland, have no frontier that admits of defence, as has before been obſerved, to defend the margraviate of Brandenburgh, the King of Pruſſia advances and takes poſſeſſion of Wittemberg, why? becauſe Brandenburgh is a flat open country, and not defenſible, except at Wittemberg.

Portugal has a weak frontier, becauſe all the chains of mountains and all the rivers run at right angles with it, of courſe, parallel to the line of operations of the invader.

Whichever way rivers are obſerved to run by the map, it may be inferred the mountains and poſitions alſo run. In Alſace they are favourable to defend the country, and the French knew how to take advantage of them.

The ſea is the frontier of England and Ireland, and the firſt defence, the Britiſh navy; but no ſtateſman or ſoldier would riſque the exiſtence of the nation under his care, upon one ſecurity.

Notwith-

Notwithſtanding the ſuperiority of our navy, in every reſpect, there exiſts a poſſibility of France being, at a future day, equal or ſuperior. If France made a deſcent on this country, ſhe would not conſider what became of her tranſports. It is much to be regretted, Mr. Pitt's plan of fortifying the dock-yards in the Channel, ſome years ago, was not carried into effect. It is ſurpriſing, that the good ſenſe of the Engliſh would not ſee how much cheaper they might be defended by militia, in works of earth, than by ſailors in ſhips of war; or the abſurdity of firſt fitting and manning a ſhip for ſea, and then being obliged to keep her rotting in harbour to defend the dock-yard. The ſuperiority of the Engliſh navy is not from excluſive reſources, but from its having very naturally, on account of its ſituation, turned its attention early to the ſea, and in conſequence, having got the ſtart of the reſt of Europe. But America and France have as good ports, as much timber, and may one day have as much trade. Had Louis the Fourteenth, inſtead of maintaining four hundred thouſand men in arms, on earth, turned his thoughts to the ſea, her navy might have been as powerful now.

For theſe reaſons it is to be wiſhed, more attention were paid to the defence of our coaſt.

A chain of telegraphes, from the north, from Galway, and Bantry, to the capital, would be very uſeful.

If a river is the frontier, and muſt be paſſed in face of an enemy, the following rules muſt be adhered to as cloſe as poſſible, viz. chooſe a rentrant angle, your banks higher than the oppoſite ones, and place batteries on each flank. The night is alſo often a favourable time. What

Marſhal

Marſhal Saxe ſays of intrenchments, may be applied to what we have read of the paſſage of rivers, ſometimes they ſucceed, " Parceque la tete tourne aux hommes quand il leur arrive des choſes, aux quels ils ne s'attendant pas,"—the paſſage of rivers often ſucceeds, becauſe it is not imagined that it will be attempted.

The beſt way to defend a river, ſays Maizeroy, is to have corps detached along it at certain diſtances, but near enough to join at the point of attack. The uſual precautions to be taken in guarding a river are, to break up fords, deſtroy boats, watch the moſt likely places, namely, where the river forms a bend towards the enemy, and where another river runs into it on the enemy's ſide, by which they might ſend down pontoons, floats, &c. Where there are iſlands raiſe redoubts on them, and mount cannon.

Of deſcents, Maizeroy ſays, Retrenchments to guard againſt them are not only uſeleſs, but dangerous. So many places admit of a debarkation, it would be unneceſſary to intrench the whole coaſt. The enemy will not preſent himſelf at a guarded place, except as a feint to divert. Every time the Engliſh deſcended on the coaſt of France, they did it with the greateſt eaſe. All that can be done is, when the intention of the enemy is evident, aſſemble troops as ſoon as poſſible, they being, it is to be ſuppoſed, previouſly arranged for the purpoſe, and advance toward the enemy. If he is in the act of landing, he ſhould be attacked without deliberation, and without heeding the prodigious fire of the covering fleet, which is not to be dreaded by troops on the ſhore and in movement; and once they come to cloſe action, the enemy can make no more uſe of his fire. If you find him landed

and

and in force, occupy ſome advantageous poſt, where he may be detained till the arrival of all the troops. If he means to eſtabliſh himſelf in the country, he will come in great force, unleſs he expects to find them diſpoſed in his favour*.

Redoubts upon a coaſt, if they have not cannon in them, are uſeleſs. As the enemy may diſembark at low water, they ſhould be made embarbetté, and placed ſo as to have a croſs fire. It is right to have points of appuy and rallying, fortified up the country. It appears that Maizeroy ſpeaks only of the ſmaller ſort of attacks. He adds the following important obſervation, The defence of a country does not conſiſt in the number of fortreſſes, but in the zeal of the people, well-regulated finances, diſciplined troops, and the facility of augmenting them whenever neceſſity requires.

The manœuvres our troops are taught, only ſerve to give them falſe ideas. Maizeroy ſays, to train troops, enterprizes of ſmall importance muſt be undertaken,—Mais il faut prendre garde de s'y faire battre. A good rule.

* The French failed in their attempt on Sardinia, becauſe they landed a very inconſiderable force, becauſe the peaſantry ruſhed down armed upon them, and becauſe they took panick.

They were defeated at Sallee, becauſe they came up the river in their boats with the tide; when it ebbed they were left ſticking in the mud, where they were aſſailed by the Moors and Arabs, and, unable to defend themſelves, they were cut to pieces by them with their ſhort ſwords. Theſe are two ſtrong inſtances of what a peaſantry can do.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.

*On the preſent State of Defence of the Country—The Force, and probable Diſtribution of it—And on the Expences and Neceſſities of the Campaign.*

THE forces in Ireland may be eſtimated at upward of thirty thouſand men, of whom twenty thouſand might be brought into the field, in different parts of the kingdom. Probably ten thouſand might, in caſe of an attack, be aſſembled. There is no train of artillery fit to take the field, equal to the exigencies of the country, nor are there magazines formed. It is ſuppoſed the cavalry could not take the field for want of forage.

There is a ſquadron of men of war at Cork.

It is ſuppoſed the troops will be encamped in ſmall corps of five thouſand each; one near Dublin, one in the ſouth, and one in the north. For the tranſporting magazines, &c. the troops are entirely dependent on the people of the country, having no carriages attached to the army for that purpoſe, which is one inconvenience. There is no corps of pontoniers, on which account the army could paſs rivers but on one column. It has been already obſerved, there are no fortreſſes in the country; there are alſo few engineers; nor have the military been in the practice of breaking ground. If it were poſſible that the whole army could aſſemble to oppoſe the

the enemy, and leave the country without troops to maintain internal peace, protect their magazines, communications, &c. such an army could not continue a month together for want of provisions.

An army of twenty thousand men, with their followers, the necessary horses, and adding only the small proportion of one thousand regular cavalry, would consume eighteen thousand barrels of corn, of all descriptions, every four weeks; besides this, it must have turf, straw, hay, and cattle. It would require fifteen thousand sheep, or two thousand head of black cattle, also, monthly; and would thus consume in that space of time, the produce of four thousand acres of land, and in the course of the campaign, of upward of twenty thousand acres, amounting in value, to upward of two hundred thousand pounds.

An army of a nominal forty thousand men, which to a certainty would not bring more than twenty thousand in the field, would cost while there, the first campaign, half a million sterling. If forty thousand effectives are necessary for the defence of the island, sixty thousand must be rated as the strength of the army, the additional expence may be calculated.

The camp equipage, and the year's stores before-hand, would require a sum of two millions, to put this country in a tolerable state of defence. One million must be added, for fortifying posts; and the casualties and contingencies, even the article of blankets, of which there must be a hundred thousand in store, comes to a large sum, and if the army are in the field, must be renewed every year. A less sum of money than four millions sterling, in the national treasury, would

would not be ſufficient to carry an army thro' the firſt campaign. Twenty thouſand men would require near two thouſand horſes, of all deſcriptions, in order to move from place to place.

Government ſhould have a hundred thouſand barrels of corn in ſtore, in the country, for the uſe of the army.

When the late Gen. Edward Dalton, marched to the Low Countries, at the time the Emperor Joſeph II. threatened Holland, his army was fed from the oppoſite ſide of the Rhine; a ſevere froſt rendered it unnavigable, and when the ſupply of bread was exhauſted, there was no remedy but to diſband the army, with orders for every man to ſhift for himſelf. Theſe orders were actually to have been iſſued, on the enſuing day, but a thaw fortunately taking place during the night, and again opening the communication, prevented the total ſeparation of the army taking place.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Finances—Taxes—Revenues.*

IF the French were to get poſſeſſion of this country, they would probably act here, as they have done elſewhere—would reſpect private property, but rob the public treaſure. The revenues they would ſeize here, are what originate from taxes, and thoſe of the church.

| | |
|---|---|
| Reckon the Hearth Tax at - - - | £.50,000 per ann. |
| The County Preſentments amount, thro' the kingdom, to not leſs than - - | 100,000 |
| Tithes and Church Revenues - - - | 450,000 |
| | £.600,000 |

A ſum of money equal to the maintenance of 30,000 troops. Suppoſe all theſe taxes were, during the preſent war, given up, and inſtead thereof two ſhillings an acre on all arable and paſture land, laid on, to be expended in the defence of the country, deducting alſo for the public roads, neceſſary ſalaries, eccleſiaſtical and others. The goodneſs of our roads is a great misfortune, it would facilitate in the greateſt degree the conqueſt of the country. Why ſhould money be expended in making roads and building bridges, when we do not know how ſoon we muſt break them up? It would only be neceſſary to retain a few of the principal ones.

It would be better for the opulent claſſes at once to contribute liberally, by a free gift for the

the defence of the country; for what would the enemy probably do, if they gained a footing here? they would aboliſh, by a manifeſto, all the above-mentioned taxes, which fall in this country ſolely on the poor, and inſtead of it lay a general tax on all property. They would be ſure in ſuch a meaſure to have the voice of the people with them*.

There are many other taxes from which revenue is drawn, but the above are what come particularly out of the pockets of the people; and an exoneration from which, would be moſt particularly felt and applauded by them. It muſt be admitted, that ſuch a change in the ſyſtem of any country is a very ſtrong meaſure; thoſe certainly ought never to be recurred to but in times of the greateſt danger. People who think that is now the caſe, will probably be alſo of opinion, that it is now neceſſary for our own ſecurity, to be at leaſt prepared to adopt ſomething ſimilar, if affairs do not very ſoon take a new turn; if they do not, there is no alternative in caſe of an attack, but ſubmiſſion; for if the ſpirit of the people is not rouſed in their own defence, if they are lukewarm and indifferent, it is impoſſible for the country to be defended by any army. There is no great hope from the convulſions in France, it is now a great military Republic, and will always be equally formidable externally, becauſe its force is derived, not from the caſual ability of a military King, or a great Stateſman, but from the ſpirit which pervades

* Tithes are in great part lay property. In whatever way the money is levied, the clergy muſt be paid. Nothing here muſt be underſtood as trenching upon the maintenance of that body; but tithes, tho' a tax, are a transferable property.

the

the whole maſs of the nation. Probably France may ultimately fall as Rome did, but it is likewiſe probable ſhe may be in the mean time equally victorious. Rome fought with nations, which, tho' barbarous, breathed a ſpirit of patriotiſm, and were unanimous againſt the invader; but the French may ſay with Shakeſpeare, "We have met with foes who ſtrike beſide us."

## CHAP. XV.

### *Miſcellaneous Obſervations.*

AN enemy's army of 50,000 men, would conſume in the various articles of the produce of the ſoil, as much as would amount weekly to upward of three thouſand acres. Theſe articles of ſubſiſtence muſt be obtained, either methodically, thro' the means of the conſtituted authorities of the country, which would be attended with leaſt miſery, or by means of pillage. Whatever a retiring army may do, it is impoſſible an advancing one could ſubſiſt a day upon the wild ſyſtem of rapine.

An invader's object is to get poſſeſſion of the country as ſoon as he can; but this is not done until the ſeat of government is in his power. Let him have what footing in the country he will, until he gains that, the vital principle remains unextinguiſhed, and the body will perform its functions. Dublin, as the capital and ſeat of government, would of courſe be the object of attack; but there is an additional reaſon, it would be neceſſary for them to gain the eaſt coaſt of the kingdom, fortify Dublin, Drogheda, &c. and there form their frontier againſt England.

Previous to Lord Howe's action with the French, tho' both fleets endeavoured their utmoſt to come to it, they were three days in ſight of each other, without being able to do ſo.

This

This proves the uncertainty of our reliance or ſecurity from the ſea. What might not have been effected by a fleet of tranſports during that time?

If this country became the theatre of war, whichever party had the advantage, Ireland would be trampled to pieces in the ſtruggle. A very few individuals make by war; the country which is the ſeat of it is beggared.

Perhaps it would be well that the Iriſh mob knew a victorious army, as well French as any other, ſuffers no people to pillage but themſelves; the exiſtence of a conquering army depends on the ſecurity of property, which it will always protect, in order to plunder it at leiſure.

On the appearance of the enemy on any part of the coaſt, the cavalry ſhould immediately drive all the cattle, and every thing moveable, behind the grand cordon, and deſtroy every thing which they could not remove. In ſhort, all between the grand cordon and the enemy, ſhould be made a deſart; but the people ſhould be indemnified. It is evident, nothing but the laſt neceſſity ſhould induce ſuch ſtrong meaſures; but in ſuch a caſe it is always done, and is unavoidable.

In a ſyſtem of defence, poſſibilities, and not probabilities alone, muſt be guarded againſt. Sometimes an enemy will not attack in the part we think probable, but on the contrary, where we may think impoſſible. But it is a weakneſs to ſuppoſe any thing impoſſible to an active enemy.

To recapitulate in a few words, that which is neceſſary to put this country in a ſtate of de-

fence; the firſt article is money, ſecondly officers.

An army fully equipped, with its equipage, field artillery, corps of pontoniers, ſtaff, and hoſpital properly appointed; this army to conſiſt of forty thouſand *effective* men (infantry), and two thouſand cavalry, a corps of engineers well acquainted with the country, and a full year's proviſion before-hand of all kinds of ſtores, with a train of carriages and horſes, to enable troops, artillery, &c. to move, without being at the mercy of the people of the country. Laſtly, we ſhould have unanimity among ourſelves.

Our army conſiſts of disjointed corps, unuſed to the ſyſtem of acting in great bodies; nor is there any probability of a regular organization of it taking place. In addition to this, the regular troops only enter it on the eaſt ſide, to embark from it on the weſt. Manœuvres in great bodies are unknown to our troops.

Parties of cavalry ſhould never be ſent out in this country, except ſuſtained by infantry.

It is unfortunately too true, that thoſe men who deſpiſe danger moſt, when at a diſtance, have the ſtrongeſt ſenſe of it when it is at hand. Courage may be the effect of conſtitution, but it is reflection gives firmneſs.

Let every perſon of property juſt revolve ſeriouſly in his mind, upon what he would do, on hearing an enemy was landed in the country, and in force; and remember what Marſhal Saxe ſays: *Que la tête tourne aux hommes, quand il leur arrive des choſes aux quels ils ne s'attendoient pas.*

FINIS.